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Abstract 
This thesis examines the multiethnic police reforms implemented in southern Serbia in 
the aftermath of the conflict in 2000 and 2001. It discusses whether the introduction of 
a multiethnic police force contributed to post-conflict peace and stability in the 
Presevo Valley. Comparing empirical findings based on existing sources, it analyzes 
the use of multiethnic police reform as a peacebuilding strategy. The thesis argues that 
the promise of multiethnic police reform initially contributed to the peace settlement 
ending major hostilities. However, inadequate training and confidence building 
measures resulted in a lack of integration with the existing local security apparatus. 
This disabled the multiethnic police to become the main security provider in the 
region. Thus, the multiethnic police force contributed less to long-term peace and 
stability. The thesis finds that the challenges characterizing the effort to reform police 
structures in southern Serbia are common to many aspects of post-conflict 
peacebuilding.           
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and Research Question 
The municipalities of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac in southern Serbia have the 
largest concentration of ethnic Albanians in Serbia. In 1992 a majority of the 
Albanians in southern Serbia voted for autonomy and the right to unification with 
Kosovo in an unofficial referendum. In 2000, following NATO’s military operations 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the deployment of international 
peacekeepers  in Kosovo, fighting broke out in the region. An Albanian secessionist 
guerilla movement, the Liberation Army of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja 
(UCPMB in Albanian), started an insurgent campaign against Yugoslav and Serb 
authorities in the three municipalities of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac in southern 
Serbia (commonly known simply as the Presevo Valley). The armed conflict in 
southern Serbia lasted for about a year and resulted in a total of approximately 100 
casualties on both sides together. An unstable peace was secured through international 
mediation. The Albanian insurgents were to be disarmed and the area and its ethnic 
Albanian inhabitants were to be integrated into Serbian institutions (Mønnesland 
2006:373). 
 
The Albanians of southern Serbia had come to view the police with hostility and 
distrust after decades of official discrimination and abuse during the 2000-2001 
conflict. International observers, local ethnic Albanian leaders and Belgrade officials 
all agreed that the police was the single most urgent area of reform. The Albanians 
sought to create a police force that would reflect the ethnic composition of the area 
(ICG 2001:10). Therefore, an essential condition for securing peace and rebuilding 
confidence following the end of hostilities was to establish a multiethnic police force 
in southern Serbia, seen as the initial step in the process of integrating Albanians into 
Serbian state institutions. The Organization of security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) was tasked to oversee a three-stage project for recruiting and training a 
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multiethnic police force (ICG 2003:18). The idea was well-received in the region and 
the multiethnic police was initially seen as a success story in conflict resolution in the 
Balkans. However, as time passed and multiethnic tensions no longer posed a great 
danger to local and regional stability, its effect on the peace process came into 
question. 
 
In the article “Serbia makes Uneven Progress on Integrating Minorities”, Pedja 
Obradovic (2011:1) argues that Belgrade is failing to turn its verbal pledges into action 
when it comes to guaranteeing ethnic Albanians fair levels of state sector employment 
in southern Serbia. Even though integration of ethnic Albanians into Serbia’s political 
and economic system was a key element of the internationally brokered plan aimed at 
restoring peace, progress remains uneven. The number of Albanians working in the 
public sector in the three municipalities remains out of sync with the ethnic structure 
of the local population. According to Obradovic (2011:1), the project for a multiethnic 
police was aimed to create a police structure that would win the confidence of both 
Albanian and Serbs. The program was seen as successful by the international 
community, Albanians and Serbs alike. In 2001, Albanians made up a little over 50 per 
cent of the police force in Presevo, close to 35 per cent in Bujanovac, and close to 5 
per cent in Medvedja.  
 
At the same time, however, Riza Halimi, the only ethnic Albanian Member of 
Parliament in the Serbian parliament, and Ragmi Mustafa, Mayor of Presevo, both 
expressed deep reservations about the future of the police project. According to 
Halimi, ‘The number of Albanians in the police has fallen in the last ten years – some 
left, others were dismissed for violations’. Mustafa also doubts the multiethnic police 
project will survive. He says ‘The idea of a multiethnic police, which was well-
received here, is not a long-term solution and I don’t believe it will survive.’ 
(Obradovic 2011:6).      
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There has not been any return to major interethnic hostilities in southern Serbia since 
the peace settlement in 2001. However, minor and scattered incidents have occurred 
throughout the decade following the establishment of the multiethnic police force. 
Ethnic grievances are still present, and southern Serbia may still be seen as an 
unsolved border dispute in former Yugoslavia. The lack of economic development in 
the region and the continued heavy presence of the Serbian security apparatus have the 
potential to spark ethnic Albanian secessionism and renewed hostilities.    
 
This thesis will analyze the establishment and conduct of the multiethnic police force 
in southern Serbia and assess its contribution on peace and stability. It will attempt to 
assess the use of multiethnic police reform as a peacebuilding tool in the Presevo 
Valley. In recent years policing has become an ever more important element in peace 
operations around the world. Therefore, insight and knowledge of this particular 
peacebuilding effort may possibly contribute to enhanced understanding of the concept 
in general. Hence, the specific research question guiding this thesis is: Did the 
multiethnic police contribute to peace in the Presevo Valley?            
 
This thesis will argue that the initial agreement on the establishment of a multiethnic 
police force in southern Serbia was an important factor for ending major hostilities as 
it made it possible for the competing parties to agree on a more comprehensive peace 
plan. However, it is difficult to assess its contribution on peace and stability in the 
longer term as the multiethnic police never got the chance to act as a de facto security 
provider in the three municipalities. Since its creation, the task of dealing with relevant 
safety and security issues was handled by other Serbian and Yugoslav security actors. 
The short term goal of recruiting and integrating minorities disabled the multiethnic 
police to take full charge of maintaining security due to lack of training and 
incompetent police officers. Thus, the long term goal of peace, stability and interethnic 
confidence based on the provision of security by a multiethnic police force was 
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hampered by short term goals. Relying too heavily on quantity as in number of 
minority officers instead of professional quality made the multiethnic police turn into a 
mere symbol of unfinished or failed reforms.   
 
1.2 Limitations and Delimitations 
This thesis is obviously limited by the chosen research method and sources. Even more 
obviously, at another level, even though the author indirectly has practical experience 
with the matter from working in neighboring Kosovo and has studied Balkan history, 
politics and society for some years, he has never set foot in the Presevo Valley. 
Initially, conducting a field study interviewing locals, both Serbs and Albanians, was 
considered as a research method. But due to factors such as available time and 
resources, this was not possible. As a consequence, this thesis will solely rely on 
secondary sources. The study will be limited by the fact that it is based on research 
conducted by others which the author has not been able to influence or investigate.          
 
This thesis will specifically deal with multiethnic police reforms in southern Serbia 
since the end of hostilities in 2001. Even though no single case exists in a vacuum, it is 
necessary to delimit the scope of this study. Historical and current events in the region 
and on the international scene most certainly played their parts in the context under 
scrutiny. This is especially true with regards to developments in neighboring Kosovo 
and Macedonia. Possibly even more important are political developments in Serbia, 
both at a national level and locally in the municipalities in question. However, even 
though probably important to events on the ground in the Presevo Valley, time and 
space available will not allow this thesis to do more than just touch upon such 
developments.  
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The choice of sources naturally delimits the scope of the thesis. No reports on southern 
Serbia have been published by the International Crisis Group since 2007. Of the three 
articles specifically on police reform in southern Serbia used in this thesis, the latest 
was published in 2010. Research for these articles was conducted in 2002 and between 
2003 and 2005 respectively. 
 
Therefore, this thesis will only study a specific peace-building effort in a specific 
geographical area, but in a less specific period – multiethnic police reform in the 
municipalities of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac in the period stretching from the 
end of hostilities in 2001 up to around 2005. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1, Introduction, provides a short introduction to the case and the research 
question guiding the study before outlining its limitations and delimitations. Then it 
outlines the structure of thesis. 
 
In Chapter 2, Methodology, after a short introduction to the chosen sources and 
methods, a short discussion on their reliability and the validity for the study will 
follow.  
 
In Chapter 3, Context, a short presentation of the geography, demography and 
historical background is made in order to contextualize the subject under scrutiny 
before a more detailed account of the southern Serbia insurgency and the peace 
settlement ending it. 
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Chapter 4, Theoretical Concepts, deals with the concepts chosen to be relevant as 
frame of reference to the study of multiethnic police reform in southern Serbia. The 
chapter is divided into three, each part representing the main concepts: peace- and 
statebuilding; policing in peace operations; and police reform. Each of the concepts 
will in turn be defined and discussed using sources which will be presented in Chapter 
2. 
 
In Chapter 5, Findings and Analysis, the empirical findings of three case-studies on 
police reform in southern Serbia will be presented and discussed. The three case-
studies will be introduced in more detail in Chapter 2. The chapter will be divided into 
parts representing relevant aspects of the subject. 
 
Chapter 6, Concluding Discussion, will use the findings and conclusions derived from 
the three case studies presented in Chapter 5 to discuss the main concepts of this study, 
emphasizing the use of multiethnic police reform as a tool used in post-conflict 
peacebuilding operations. Concluding remarks will be drawn in response to the 
specific research question of this thesis. 
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2. Methodology 
Relying on a rather small number of written sources and methodically solely analyzing 
and comparing already existing sources, it is necessary to briefly introduce them. The 
sources are for practical reasons divided in the following into parts relying on whether 
they are used mostly for background information, concepts and theory or empirical 
findings. Moreover, the research methods used by the authors of the three case-specific 
articles are outlined.         
 
2.1 Sources 
Information on the background on the area, the conflict and the peace settlement are 
for the most part based on four reports published by the International Crisis Group 
(ICG) in the period stretching from 2001 to 2007.  Background information of a more 
general nature is extracted from publications on Kosovo by renowned authors, such as 
Tim Judah. Details on the “Covic plan” are compiled from the booklet Serbia After 
Milosevic: Program for the Solution of the Crisis in Pcinja District, edited by Milo 
Gligorijevic (2001).   
 
The main theoretical concepts discussed in this thesis are peace- and statebuilding, 
policing in peace operations and police reform. Information on the theory and practice 
of peace-and statebuilding are derived from three academic textbooks. Mads Berdal’s 
(2009) Building Peace after War deals with modern peacebuilding in general and can 
be viewed as a critique of the lack of contextualization which characterized many 
peace operations during the last part of the 20
th
 Century. A volume edited by Roland 
Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (2009), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding. Confronting the 
Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations argues that a lot more attention needs to 
be put on constructing functioning local institutions in war-torn societies. The second 
edition of Understanding Peacekeeping by Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams 
(2010) gives a descriptive picture of peacekeeping operations in general and of 
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policing in particular. All of the theory on policing in peace operations used in this 
thesis is compiled from Chapter 17 of Understanding Peacekeeping. The theoretical 
background on police reform is based on the articles also used for analysis of empirical 
findings on the multiethnic police in southern Serbia (see below).  
 
The empirical findings on the multiethnic police and police reform in southern Serbia 
are based on three academic papers which all deal with police reform in the region 
after the end of hostilities in 2001. Two of the articles, Thorsten Stodiek’s (2006) The 
OSCE and the Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Forces in the Balkans and Florian 
Bieber’s (2010) ’Policing the Peace after Yugoslavia: Police Reform between External 
Imposition and Domestic Reform’ are comparative multi-case analyses, dealing with 
post-conflict police reform efforts in the various successor states and regions in former 
Yugoslavia. Barry J. Ryan’s (2007) “Quasi-pluralism in a Quasi-peace: South Serbia’s 
Multi-ethnic Police”, an article published in International Peacekeeping, on the other 
hand, is a single-case study on the introduction of multi-ethnic policing units in 
southern Serbia with emphasis on Community-Oriented Policing programs. 
 
Acknowledging that all these publications are based on other primary sources and 
research conducted by other scholars, for the most part only these publications will be 
used as references throughout the thesis. The author also acknowledges that other 
relevant sources, both of a theoretical and empirical nature, most likely are available. 
These sources could probably have contributed to this study, but the choices made on 
sources will delimit and guide the remainder of the thesis.         
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2.2 Methods 
The primary method applied to increase understanding of the contribution of the 
multiethnic police force to the peace process in southern Serbia is a comparison and 
analysis of already existing written sources. While initially planning to conduct 
interviews with individuals who have worked closely with police reform in the 
Presevo Valley, negative responses from potential interview subjects in combination 
with time limitations made this impossible. However, comparing and analyzing the 
empirical findings and conclusions of the three multi- and single-case studies will 
enable this thesis to identify general trends with regards to the conduct of the 
multiethnic police, how it is perceived by the local population and its level of 
legitimacy. These findings may be used as indications on how the multiethnic police 
force contributed to post-conflict peace and stability in southern Serbia. The empirical 
findings will in turn be discussed against the main theoretical concepts and the 
arguments made by the scholars having dealt with the main concepts.      
 
The aims and choice of methods in each of the three articles dealing with police 
reform in southern Serbia vary somehow. The aim of Thorsten Stodiek’s study, The 
OSCE and the Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Forces in the Balkans, A Centre for 
OSCE Research (CORE) Working paper from 2006, is ‘to compare the international 
police activities of the OSCE, UN and EU in Kosovo, South Serbia (Presevo Valley) 
and Macedonia in order to analyze whether, and to what extent multi-ethnic police 
services can help to overcome the legacy of ethno-political conflicts’; ‘to identify the 
structural deficiencies of post-socialist security sectors’; and to study the problems 
facing the international community ‘when they developed and implemented their 
training and reform concepts.’ The findings of Stodiek’s study are ‘based on the 
analysis of a number of documents and research reports (…) as well as on numerous 
oral interviews and a comprehensive written survey with local police officers and their 
instructors and monitors (…) carried out by the author between September 2003 and 
June 2005 (Stodiek 2006:10,13).  
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Barry J. Ryan (2007) examines efforts made by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Serbian Ministry of Interior (MoI) to reform 
police policies in southern Serbia in “Quasi-pluralism in a Quasi-peace: South Serbia’s 
Multi-ethnic Police”. His article draws on research undertaken in the Presevo Valley in 
November 2002. Respondents included local government representatives, members of 
non-governmental organizations, media-representatives and a refugee from Kosovo. 
Participants included seven Albanians, five Roma and ten Serbs. The work also draws 
upon a number of unstructured interviews with key actors in the reform process in 
Serbia (Ryan 2007:284).  
 
Florian Bieber’s (2010) ‘Policing the Peace after Yugoslavia: Police Reform between 
External Imposition and Domestic Reform’ does not seem to be based on research 
carried out by the author, and does unfortunately not include any notes on the use of 
methods. As a Discussion Paper produced for a Statebuilding Workshop on organizing 
police forces in post-conflict peace-support operations, Bieber’s analysis of police 
reform in southern Serbia is based on information derived from various written 
sources, including OSCE documents, an International Crisis Group Report and an 
article in the Helsinki Monitor.   
 
Throughout the remainder of the thesis, the arguments presented will be directly based 
on the sources. As such, the sources will speech for themselves. However, the main 
concepts and empirical findings will be summarized and briefly discussed at the end of 
each sub-chapter.     
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2.3 Reliability and Validity 
Reliability deals with the way research was conducted and the extent to which the 
measure is free from random error. As this study relies on secondary sources only, it is 
hard to assess their reliability and whether the conclusions are based on correct 
measurements. However, a critical approach to the chosen sources will be applied 
throughout. It can be argued that the conclusions drawn by at least one of the 
contributors in the empirical part of the thesis, Thorsten Stodiek’s (2006) The OSCE 
and the Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Forces in the Balkans, may be biased in favor 
of the conduct of the OSCE and the multiethnic police as it is a Centre for OSCE 
Research (CORE) Working paper, possibly connected to the OSCE itself. However, no 
conclusions are drawn on the reliability of the source in question, and its findings will 
be taken into account in the remainder of the thesis. 
 
Validity means relevance. It deals with the extent to which a measure reflects the 
desired concept it is supposed to measure. Validity may be both internal and external. 
In this thesis, internal validity is related to whether the choice of sources and methods 
enables the study to answer its research question. As already mentioned, it is hard to 
assess the contribution of the multiethnic police force on the peace process in southern 
Serbia as it never actually played a significant role as a security provider. However, 
the findings and conclusions of the chosen sources may say something about the 
reasons for why this happened.    
 
External validity deals with to what extent the results of a study are relevant to 
subjects and settings beyond those in the study. In this thesis, external validity is 
related to whether or not findings and conclusions on multiethnic police reform in 
southern Serbia are relevant to other similar peacebuilding efforts in other post-
conflict settings throughout the world. Acknowledging that all cases are unique, 
however, the thesis will argue that some of the findings and conclusions drawn may be 
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relevant to other settings and subjects. Particularly, the findings on inadequate training 
and overemphasis on the quantity of minority representation instead of qualifications 
may be relevant to other peacebuilding operations in which multiethnic police reform 
is included.           
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3. Context 
The relative narrowness of the subject of this study makes it necessary to give a short 
introduction of the context in which the multiethnic police reforms took place. As 
already mentioned, time and space does not allow this study to include a ‘history if the 
Balkans’. But a general overview of the geography, demography, the historical 
background and more recent developments is needed in order for the reader to be more 
familiar with southern Serbia, the Presevo insurgency and the peace settlement. 
 
3.1 Geography 
The three municipalities of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac are located in the 
southern part of the Republic of Serbia along Kosovo’s eastern border and together 
cover an area of 1,267 square kilometers (BIRN 2011). Also known as the upper 
Morava Valley, the area is relatively fertile, with tall mountains to the east separating 
it from Bulgaria and lower mountains to the west separating it from Kosovo (ICG 
2007:2). To its south the valley is bounded Macedonia. The area is often referred to as 
the Presevo Valley and Albanians often call it Kosova Lindore - Eastern Kosovo 
(Judah 2008:5). Presevo and Bujanovac are part of the Pcinje administrative district 
centered in Vranje, while Medvedja is part of the Jablanica district, with Leskovac as 
its administrative center (ICG 2007:2). 
 
As part of the north-south corridor formed by the Morava and Vardar rivers and their 
tributaries, the Presevo Valley sits on the main historical trade and invasion route 
between Western Europe and the Levant. Its location makes it a region of strategic 
economic importance as it gives Serbia access to the northern Greek port of 
Thessaloniki on the Aegean Sea, via the Serbian city of Nis and the Macedonian 
capital of Skopje. Serbia’s main north-south motorway begins in Belgrade and ends 
near Nis, just north of the Presevo Valley. It is also the route for a yet unfinished 
major motorway, Corridor 10, connecting Greece and Central Europe. Together with 
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an adjacent railway line, this road is Serbia’s main link to Macedonia and Greece, two 
states with Orthodox majorities that sympathized with the Serbs throughout the 
conflicts in the 1990s (ICG 2003:2). The Presevo Valley could also be in the middle 
of a possible east-west corridor of future oil or natural gas pipelines going from The 
Black Sea to the Albanian Adriatic Coast (ICG 2001:2; ICG 2007:2). 
 
3.2 Demography 
The three municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja together have Serbia’s 
largest concentration of ethnic Albanians. According to a 2002 census, there was a 
total of 61,647 Albanians living in Serbia, not counting Kosovo. Of those, 59,952 
lived in the Presevo Valley (Wikipedia 2012). Of the valley’s approximately 100,000 
inhabitants, it is estimated that around 70% are Albanians. The municipalities vary 
with regards to the number of their Albanian population. According to the ICG 
(2007:2), the ethnic composition, based on the 2002 census, is: 
- Presevo:  2,984 (8.55%) Serbs; 31,098 (89.09%) Albanians; and 322 
(0.92%) Roma. 
- Bujanovac:  14,782 (34.14%) Serbs; 23,681 (54.69%) Albanians; 
and 3,867 (8.93% Roma. 
- Medvedja: 7,163 (66.57%) Serbs; 2,816 (26.17%) Albanians; 
and 109 (1.0%) Roma. 
 
Medvedja is completely rural and has only about 10,000 residents. Prior to the 
conflict, some 70 per cent were Serbs, the remainder Albanians. However, almost all 
the Albanians fled to Kosovo, and as of 2007 only some 800 have returned (ICG 
2007:2). Bujanovac has the most complex ethnic balance, approximately 55 per cent 
Albanian, 34 per cent Serb and 9 per cent Roma. Presevo is almost 90 per cent 
Albanian. Each municipality also has a statistically insignificant number of other 
ethnicities (ICG 2003:3). 
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According to the International Crisis Group (2006:3), long-term demographic trends 
seem to favor the Albanians. Serbia is an aging nation, with an average age of 38.9 
years in central regions and Vojvodina. In southern Serbia the average age is even 
higher, with the exception, due to the high Albanian birth rates there, of Bujanovac 
and Presevo. Of Bujanovac’s 1,405 high school students in 2006, slightly over 900 
were Albanians, and only some 505 were Serbs. The same imbalance was also present 
in the six Albanian and four Serbian elementary schools (ICG 2007:3). 
 
Across ethnic lines, the entire south of Serbia is impoverished. Southern Serbia is one 
of the poorest regions in Serbia proper and has suffered from years of economic 
neglect. According to the 2002 census, the average annual income in Belgrade was 
68,820 dinars, whereas the average in Presevo was only 9,352 (Ryan 2007:284-285). 
The absence of economic opportunities and the closure of state-owned companies 
have resulted in forced urbanization and emigration. This population outflow, 
combined with ethnic cleansing during the 2000-2001 insurgency and a greying 
Serbian population seems to be taking toll throughout the region 
 
There have always been significant commercial and population movements across 
what have only recently become international borders, either de jure or de facto 
(Macedonia 1992 and Kosovo 1999/2008). Ties among the three regions have always 
remained strong, and many residents of southern Serbia, Albanian and Serb alike, 
have family links to Kosovo and northern Macedonia (ICG 2003:2). Mads Berdal 
(2009:38-40) argues that the political economy of armed conflicts which tend to be 
embedded in informal regional networks formed across formal frontiers is important 
to understand the dynamics of conflict. He argues that, according to Michael Pugh, 
Neil Cooper and Jonathan Goodhand, this is especially the case in relation to so-called 
‘marginalized borderlands’; areas constituting ‘a pivotal locus in the emergence of 
violent political economies and [therefore] vital area[s] in which to focus attempts to 
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construct a post-conflict peace’ – the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia cited as an 
example. 
 
3.3. Historical Background 
Since the late 14
th
 Century, the area which now includes Kosovo, southern Serbia and 
Macedonia have almost always been located within common borders, either during 
the Ottoman Turkish Empire (1389-1912), the Kingdom of Serbia (1912-1915), or the 
various Yugoslav successor states (1918-1992).The only brief exceptions were a 
period from 1878 to 1912, when the Congress of Berlin had awarded Medvedja to 
Serbia while leaving Bujanovac and Presevo in the Ottoman Empire, and an even 
shorter period during Italian and German occupation from 1940 to 1945, when 
Macedonia was partitioned between Bulgaria and an expanded Albania which also 
included most of Kosovo (ICG 2003:2).  
 
Part of the recent instability in the region can be traced back to the border settlements 
imposed in the decade after 1912, which divided territories inhabited by Albanians 
between the former Yugoslav republics of Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro on the 
one hand and the newly independent state of Albania on the other. This resulted in the 
fact that a majority of ethnic Albanians lived outside an Albanian national state 
(Judah 2002:ix; ICG 2001:2). 
 
Serbian invasion and occupation of Kosovo and Macedonia in the First Balkan War 
(1912) was followed by what could now be termed ethnic cleansing of Albanians. 
Many survivors retreated into the hills above the Presevo Valley, where bitter 
memories of expulsion and atrocities were kept alive through oral histories. In 
Presevo and Bujanovac the invasions left deep scars, intensified by the fact that 
neighbors in Medvedja had been subjected to the same process in 1878, following 
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transfer to Serbia at the Conference of Berlin (ICG 2003:2-3). Interethnic relations 
never seemed to have fully recovered (ICG 2001:2).  
 
After the Second World War, parts of the Albanian inhabited areas of the Presevo 
Valley were a part of the Serbian autonomous province of Kosovo, but after the 
redrawing of administrative borders in 1947 they became a part of Serbia proper 
(Judah 2002:ix; ICG 2001:2). During the postwar period, Albanians were subjected to 
decades of institutionalized discrimination, which was further stepped up by Slobodan 
Milosevic in the late 1980s (ICG 2006:2).  
 
In 1992, while Yugoslavia was already breaking apart, the majority of the Albanians 
of the Presevo Valley voted in favor of separation from Serbia and joining Kosovo in 
an unofficial referendum. Though this never materialized, it was a clear indication of 
a growing desire among the Presevo Valley’s Albanian inhabitants to secede from 
Serbia within its existing borders (ICG 2007:1).  
 
3.4 The Presevo Insurgency 
During the Kosovo conflict and the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) between March and June 1999, the Presevo Valley’s 
Albanian population suffered arbitrary arrests and violent harassment at the hands of 
Serbian and Yugoslav state security forces, which in some cases allegedly tortured 
and executed civilians (ICG 2003:1). After the Serb withdrawal from Kosovo, the 
Albanians of the Presevo Valley were put under even greater pressure as Yugoslav 
forces, in particular the Yugoslav Army’s (VJ) notorious Pristina Corps, relocated 
there from Kosovo in June 1999 (ICG 2001:2).  
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The history of abuse and discrimination, reinforced by poor economic conditions and 
perceived lack of opportunities, combined with the success of their ethnic kin in 
Kosovo, fuelled extremist nationalist tendencies and gave many Albanians reason to 
support the small groups of Albanian fighters who began to organize under the banner 
of the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB) in early 
2000. With support from former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK) elements 
inside Kosovo, they began to attack police and army units while exploiting Belgrade’s 
light security presence in the Ground Security Zone (GSZ) (ICG 2003:1; ICG 2007:1; 
Ryan 2007:284).  
 
The Military Technical Agreement between FRY and NATO made all Yugoslav 
forces withdraw on 15 July 1999 to a line five kilometers behind the new international 
administrative border between Serbia and Kosovo. This area was called the Ground 
Safety Zone (GSZ) and created a security vacuum which enabled the UCPMB to 
begin military operations against Serb authority in the region (Ryan 2007:284). 
Intended to prevent accidental clashes between KFOR and the Yugoslav armed 
forces, the rules of the GSZ barred all regular soldiers and heavy armor and allowed 
only police with light arms. The UCPMB exploited the GSZ to launch hit-and-run 
attacks on Serbian security forces in southern Serbia with virtual impunity (King & 
Mason 2006:105). During the winter of 2000, the UCPMB took advantage of this 
artificial safe haven to seize several villages in the GSZ in the vicinity of Dobrosin 
(ICG 2001:3). 
 
The UCPMB made its first public appearance at the funeral of two ethnic Albanian 
brothers allegedly killed by Serbian police while driving a tractor in Dobrosin in 
January 2000. Uniformed men appeared proclaiming they were members of the 
UCPMB and declared their intention to protect the local people by driving Serbian 
security forces out of the Presevo Valley. It soon became clear that the UCPMB was 
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not a single group but a mix of locally based and mustered forces. Their key political 
objective was autonomy for the three municipalities, with the eventual goal of 
unification with Kosovo (ICG 2001:2-3). 
 
Slobodan Milosevic and his regime were removed from power in Belgrade in October 
2000. This made the leaders of the UCPMB fear that international opinion would 
change in favor of the new Serbian regime. As a consequence, the UCPMB, 
commanded by Shefket Musliu, launched a wider offensive on 22 November 2000 
and began a campaign to expel Serbian security forces from the Presevo Valley (ICG 
2001:3).  
 
A combination of international pressure on the UCPMB, lack of support from ethnic 
Albanian political leaders in Kosovo and military restraint shown by Serb forces in 
the region strengthened Albanian moderates, such as Riza Halimi, and resulted in a 
ceasefire on 27 November 2000. More radical elements of the UCPMB, however, 
gradually changed position and began framing the hostilities in terms of a fight for 
minority rights rather than for a change in borders (Ryan 2007:286). 
 
3.5 The Covic Plan and the Reoccupation of the GSZ 
The continuation of hostilities and the deaths of four policemen challenged the unity 
of the new governing coalition in Belgrade, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia 
(DOS). The nationalist faction in DOS, represented by FRY President Vojislav 
Kostunica and his associates, issued an ultimatum for NATO to evict the UCPMB 
from their new positions. On the opposite side, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic 
and Deputy Prime Minister Nebosja Covic, representing the moderate wing of DOS, 
struggled to convince skeptical colleagues to be patient in order to win NATO’s 
support (ICG 2001:3).  
 
 
 
 
20 
 
In December 2000, Covic was appointed president of a new ad hoc body, the 
Coordination Body for southern Serbia. Yugoslav and Serbian officials held meetings 
with NATO officials in Bujanovac, a first step in forging a relationship that later 
delivered rewards. When Covic led a delegation to Brussels in February 2001, he 
persuaded NATO’s political governing body, the North Atlantic Council, to accept 
Belgrade’s plan for FRY and Serbian forces to reoccupy the GSZ (ICG 2001:3). 
 
The Serbian government presented a plan drawn up by the Coordination Body for 
southern Serbia, commonly known simply as the “Covic Plan”. The plan had two 
conceptual aims. The first was that the three municipalities in their entirety should 
remain parts of Serbia with no border changes and no autonomy. The second was a 
variety of reforms intended to end official discrimination of ethnic Albanians by 
integrating them into Serbian institutions, like the police and the education system, 
and to assure all citizens of their civil rights. The plan also included a number of 
concrete measures aimed at confidence-building, such as the withdrawal of VJ units 
from population centers, disciplining of police and investigations into human right 
abuses (ICG 2001:5).     
 
As such, the plan sought to convince ethnic Albanians to abandon their ambitions of 
“Eastern Kosovo”. The plan had four pillars: 1) “elimination of threats to “state 
sovereignty” and “territorial integrity”; 2) security, freedom of movement and the 
right to return to Presevo Valley, through the disarmament and disbanding of 
“terrorists” and “demilitarization of the region”; 3) “development of a multiethnic and 
multi-confessional society”, and 4) economic and social development (Gligorijevic 
2001:70). 
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More specifically, the “Covic plan” states that ‘the elimination of the problems 
associated with terrorism in southern Serbia requires a unique approach of all 
government and political factors, expressed in the unique attitudes which include: (…) 
assurance of a multiethnic society (…) with the gradual restoration of interethnic 
confidence and tolerance in the region.’ The plan (Ibid.: 58-59) further envisages the 
‘Integration of the Albanians in the government and social system and the respect for 
their human rights in accordance with the European standards, which would imply 
adjustment of the ethnic structure of employment in civil service (…) with the ethnic 
structure of the population;’ and ‘the performance of police services and of the 
measures towards the citizens by ethnically mixed police patrols (Albanian – Serb).’ 
(Gligorijevic 2001:56-57).  
 
Dealing with restoration of peace and security in the regions, the international 
community were expected to assist the implementation of the following tasks: ‘(…) 
Withdrawal of the extraordinary engaged military and police forces, with the return or 
remaining of the regular police of ethnically mixed composition in the villages 
(stations, patrols and other forms of regular service)’ and ‘Amnesty from criminal 
responsibility and “pacification”, or “recycling” of terrorists into civilians with full 
freedom of their movements, provided that they do not commit concrete acts of 
violence until the end of this phase.’ (Gligorijevic 2001:61-62). The international 
community would be expected to primarily engage in (…) Cooperation in the 
elaboration of the models for the solution of various questions and suggestions 
regarding the training of the police for the work in multiethnic communities.’ 
(Gligorijevic 2001:64-65). 
 
The plan specifically sets goals for the implementation of the integration of Albanians 
in the socio-political system of the Republic of Serbia which should ‘be achieved (…) 
according to the following schedule: within 2 months – 10%; within 4 months – 20%; 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
within 8 months – 40%; and within 24 months – 100%.’ It further states that the 
integration of Albanians would be achieved through the following tasks: ‘The 
harmonization of the ethnic structure of the employees in the police, (…) (including 
the harmonization of the ethnic structure of the managers).’ The stated result of this 
measure is ‘Hiring and giving jobs to Albanians’ while ‘Competent organs’ is charged 
with the task. The condition is stated as ‘That they fulfill the legal conditions’ and the 
deadline is set at 60 days after the signing of the agreement. The plan (Ibid.:108) also 
envisages ‘Increased control of the legality of the work of the police and of other 
organs, with emphasis on the violation of human rights of Albanians by state organs’, 
with the result being efficient reactions to justified complaints and grievances of the 
citizens. ‘Competent organs’ was again charged with the task while no deadline was 
set, but a report on the topic should be submitted within 30 days after the signing of 
the agreement (Gligorijevic 2001:103,105). 
 
The plan further envisages ‘Engagement of ethnically mixed police patrols and other 
police units in action undertaken in the places with Albanian population.’ This should 
result in ‘Ethnically mixed patrols in villages populated by Albanians’. The 
responsible chief of police is charged with the task, the condition being ‘Number of 
employed Albanian policemen’. The deadline set for this task should correspond to the 
‘implementation of the tasks under 3, after the fulfillment of all security conditions.’ 
(Gligorijevic 2001:109). 
 
According to the plan, the restoration of security and peace implies: ‘The withdrawal 
of extraordinarily engaged, separate and special military and police forces, the return 
or remaining of the regular police of ethnically mixed composition in the territory and 
peacetime military units.’ The ‘remaining or return of the local police of nationally 
mixed composition and the continuation of their regular tasks in the demilitarized 
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zones’ should be implemented within 120 days after the signing of the agreement 
(Gligorijevic 2001:110,115,118).   
 
Emphasizing greater participatory and economic rights, this three-stage plan focused 
on confidence-building mechanisms among ethnic communities in the region. Phase 
one envisaged the integration of ethnic Albanians into the political and social 
structures of Serbia – and promised to improve, within a period of eight months, 
access and inclusion for ethnic Albanians to state services; to guarantee adequate 
representation in local and central government; to hold democratic local elections and 
facilitate the re-institution of mixed police patrols in southern Serbia consisting of 
equal numbers of Serb and ethnic Albanian officers. Phase two envisaged the 
demilitarization of the region and, in return for an end to hostilities and the 
disarmament of extremist forces, additional military and police withdrawal from the 
region. An amnesty would be granted to all former combatants, and regular local 
police would take over and normalize the situation. Displaced persons would be able 
to return, and they would receive support and protection from state officials. Phase 
three envisaged a structural revitalization of the region, which included repairing 
homes and accommodation of displaced persons (Ryan 2007:286).  
 
The DOS moderates’ emphasis on getting NATO on board prevailed despite tough 
rhetoric by elements within the political establishment in Belgrade. From December 
2000, Yugoslav officials had requested NATO to lead negotiations with the UCPMB. 
NATO responded positively to the request, and Shawn Sullivan, a political advisor to 
KFOR, started negotiating with the insurgents. Covic wanted to employ NATO to 
avoid potential political pitfalls and use Presevo as an example to showcase 
Belgrade’s new moderate dispensation and accelerate the international rehabilitation 
of FRY and Serbia (ICG 2001:4). 
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Meanwhile, to the south of the Presevo Valley, beginning in February 2001, ethnic 
Albanians guerillas calling themselves the National Liberation Army (NLA/UCK) 
had started an insurgent campaign against government forces in the northern part of 
Macedonia. This soon became an urgent concern for NATO and the decision to allow 
the Serbs back into the GSZ was a consequence of KFOR’s need to use its resources 
on Kosovo’s southern border with Macedonia instead of on its eastern internal border 
with Serbia (ICG 2001:4).  
 
KFOR’s main concern was force protection. As Serbian security forces no longer 
posed a substantial threat to its soldiers, the UCPMB insurgency was viewed as the 
greatest danger to the NATO-led force in Kosovo – especially after KFOR began 
conducting operations countering arms smuggling across the border between Kosovo 
and Serbia. NATO also feared the possible scenario of KFOR being surrounded by 
two simultaneous Albanian insurgencies on both its eastern and southern flanks (ICG 
2001:4). 
 
As a consequence, on 8 March 2001, NATO accepted Belgrade’s plan for a phased 
reduction and reoccupation of the GSZ based on the “Covic Plan”. The Serbian 
government signed an interim ceasefire agreement with one of several ethnic 
Albanian insurgent groups on 12 March. On 14 March VJ border guards, Ministry of 
Interior Police (MUP) and regular army units entered the southernmost part of the 
GSZ, on the border with Macedonia. Meanwhile, KFOR worked to “convince, cajole 
and threaten” Kosovo Albanian leaders to abandon their support of the UCPMB. The 
insurgents in southern Serbia started to find themselves isolated (ICG 2001:4).   
 
On 14 May 2001, NATO announced that Yugoslav forces would be allowed to return 
to the rest of the GSZ in the Presevo Valley, known as Sector B, on 24 May 2001 
(Ibid.:6). KFOR promised an amnesty to UCPMB fighters if they entered Kosovo and 
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gave up their weapons. Covic confirmed the Serbian government’s offer of a general 
amnesty to the rebel fighters. At the same time, considerable international pressure 
was exerted on Kosovo Albanian leaders to express support for a political solution to 
the crisis (ICG 2001:7). As a consequence, on 20 May 2001 UCPMB Commander 
Shefket Musliu signed a NATO declaration promising to “demilitarize, demobilize 
and disband” his forces in the GSZ no later than 31 May. Also known as the Konjulj 
Agreement, the demilitarization statement was also signed by Shawn Sullivan, now 
NATO Head of Office in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (ICG 2003:2).      
 
Fears that the reentry of FRY forces into the central sub sector of Sector B, the 
UCPMB’s stronghold, could spark human rights abuses or an escalation of hostilities 
in the Presevo Valley were not born out. The government deployed approximately 
15,000 soldiers and police throughout the GSZ and other parts of southern Serbia. 
Given the lack of any strong resistance from the UCPMB, the Yugoslav security 
presence was soon reduced toward the promised final number of about 1,800 (ICG 
2001:6).   
 
Serbian forces entered the final sub sector on 31 May 2001. Some scattered incidents 
during the reoccupation appeared to pose as threats to the peace process at the time. 
Eventually, however, they served to confirm to all sides the lack of alternatives. The 
UCPMB understood that the FRY forces would not be deterred by rebel acts of 
bravado. International observers argued that VJ had abandoned the brutal tactics of 
the Milosevic era and that it had shown its capability to mount a minimal but highly 
effective display of force and then been able to quickly negotiate a ceasefire. Apart 
from a few incidents, international officials reported that the week-long redeployment 
of government forces in Sector B went more smoothly than anyone had expected 
(ICG 2001:6-7).  
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Belgrade and the UCPMB had competed to get NATO on its side, a competition that 
the UCPMB was bound to loose in the Presevo Valley. Based on the experience of the 
UCK in Kosovo, some UCPMB leaders apparently believed that they enjoyed U.S. 
support until the final phase of the reoccupation of the GSZ in late May 2001. It is 
more likely that the U.S. felt betrayed by the UCPMB and their use of the GSZ as a 
safe haven and was only deterred from giving the VJ a free hand to counter the 
militants by fear of possible reprisals (ICG 2001:4). 
 
UCPMB leaders were slow to understand and adjust to the new reality that from a 
regional and strategic perspective, good relations with the new regime in Belgrade 
was prioritized over southern Serbia. At the same time, NATO worked to convince 
local Albanians in the Presevo Valley that the UCPMB could never deliver on its 
political goals while the new government in Belgrade should be given a chance. Until 
February or March 2001, a majority of ethnic Albanians in southern Serbia supported 
the insurgents, but due to NATO’s facilitation efforts a third alternative appeared – a 
government presence constrained by international observation. To most Albanians 
this appeared at least worth trying (ICG 2001:4). 
 
It can be argued that the settlement of the conflict in southern Serbia was a unique 
event in recent Balkan history in many ways. It was the first time that NATO itself 
had played a central facilitating role in the Balkans. It was the first time that the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had legally gained territory. It was also the first time 
that NATO determinedly sided with the Serbs against Albanians (ICG 2001:1).     
 
In the following this thesis will examine and discuss an important component of the 
“Covic Plan”, namely the multiethnic police force and the reforms associated with it. 
The aim of the remainder of the thesis is to assess the contribution of the multiethnic 
police force on peace and stability in the Presevo Valley. The introduction of 
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multiethnic police reform was understood a vital part of the peacebuilding effort in 
southern Serbia. The next chapter will explain and examine in general terms the role 
of policing and police reform in peace- and statebuilding operations.  
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4. Theoretical Concepts 
The main concepts that will be introduced and discussed as theoretical frame of 
reference in this thesis are peace- and statebuilding, policing in peace operations and 
police reform. These three concepts are all related, as police reform and policing in 
peace operations have become important elements in modern peacebuilding 
operations. In recent years statebuilding has been widely acknowledged as a 
fundamental aspect of efforts to establish peace in war-torn societies, and may, 
according to Paris and Sisk (2009:14-15), be viewed as a ‘sub-component of 
peacebuilding’. It is possible to argue that the concepts are related to each other too 
such a degree that it is difficult to explain and discuss one without the other. This 
thesis will argue that in order to investigate the more specific concepts dealing with 
policing in peace operations and police reform, it is necessary to explain and define 
peace-and statebuilding, as the former concepts in most circumstances cannot exist 
outside settings characterized by the latter concept(s). In the following these concepts 
will be explained and discussed using the sources of information mentioned above. 
 
4.1 Peace- and Statebuilding 
The term ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ was introduced by the then-UN Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 in his ‘An Agenda for Peace’. He identified it 
as ‘activities to build peace after conflict in order to avoid its recurrence.’ (Bellamy & 
Williams 2012:17). In an effort to assess the implications for the UN at the end of the 
Cold War, Boutros-Ghali defined the term broadly to cover ‘action to identify and 
support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a 
relapse into conflict’ (Berdal 2009:17-18). According to Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding 
might include functions such as ‘disarming the previously warring parties and the 
restoration of order, (…) advisory and training support for security personnel, (…) 
strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes 
of political participation.’ (Paris & Sisk 2009:5). 
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Since its introduction the term has remained closely associated with the UN and is 
treated as one of its core functions in the peace and security field (Berdal 2009:17-18). 
The UN definition of peacebuilding has become even broader, now covering 
‘integrated and coordinated actions aimed at addressing the root causes of violence, 
whether political, legal, institutional, military, humanitarian, human-rights-related, 
environmental, economic and social, cultural and demographic’. Also, crucial to the 
UN understanding of the concept is the belief and insistence that actions in these 
different spheres are ‘mutually reinforcing’ (Berdal 2009:18). This broadened 
definition, which included ‘everything from preventive diplomacy and humanitarian 
aid to different types of civilian assistance, military operations, development activities, 
and post-conflict reconstruction’ (Paris & Sisk 2009:5) made clear that the purpose of 
peacebuilding had evolved to include both remedial and preventive aspects - aimed at 
consolidating peace after war and simultaneously preventing renewed violence in post-
conflict societies (Paris & Sisk 2009:5). In 2007 the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations identified peacebuilding as ‘a range of measures aimed at reducing the risk 
of lapsing or relapsing into conflict.’ (Bellamy & Williams 2010:15).   
 
Mads Berdal (2009:13) argues in Building Peace after War that the aims of post-Cold 
war peacebuilding, specifically its focus on supporting ‘political, institutional, and 
social transformations necessary to overcome deep-seated internal animosities and 
strife’ is far too ambitious, especially in its transformative commitment. He believes 
that the argument that contemporary peacebuilding has sought to ‘compress into a few 
years evolution that have taken centuries’ contains elements of truth. 
 
Berdal (2009:18-20) believes that although the UN definition and its aspirations, 
which is also implicit in much of the peacebuilding literature, ‘conveys a profound and 
laudable aspiration’: to shift the focus of away from simply ending conflict and 
violence to something ‘more positive and ambitious’, it suffers from two weaknesses, 
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both from an analytical and a policymaking perspective. First, the term comprises ‘the 
entire basket of post-war needs’ without containing any sense of priorities. Second, he 
believes that approaches to peacebuilding ‘have displayed a marked tendency to 
abstract the tasks of peacebuilding from their political, cultural and historical context.’ 
This tendency has in Berdal’s view encouraged a social-engineering approach to the 
concept of peacebuilding.         
 
Berdal (2009: 20-21,24-25) draws a distinction between the critical phase that follows 
the end of major hostilities and/or the signature of a peace settlement, and the longer-
term challenges of rebuilding societies emerging from violent conflict. His focus in 
Building Peace after War is primarily on the former period, ‘when levels of insecurity 
are high; when violence is pervasive; when institutions are rudimentary, weak or non-
existent; and when the very distinction between war and peace is blurred.’ This period 
may, and most often does, come in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict. But, 
according to Berdal, the distinction between the phases is not always simple and clear 
and cannot necessarily be defined in ‘purely temporal terms.’ He believes it is ‘futile 
to define the length of the early and critical period with any degree of precision.’ The 
period should not be understood in ‘purely negative or risk-filled terms: it is better 
seen as a unique kind of political space, shaped by fatigue, uncertainty and war-
weariness, but also by the hope that the new political dispensation will result in rapid 
improvements to quality of life.’  
 
Berdal (2009:20-21) argues that ‘ultimately, the long-term outcome of an intervention 
– its success or failure – may be determined during the ‘first’ period, as it provides the 
crucial opportunities for getting things right or badly wrong.’ In Building Peace after 
War, he is concerned with the nature of that period during which the long-term 
outcome of an intervention ‘may be said to hang in the balance’, and with ‘the policy 
challenges that are presented in this time.’ Berdal argues that ‘this is the period when 
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the trade-offs and the difficult policy choices arise, when expectations are high but 
when the best may also be the enemy of the good.’ The trade-offs are consequences of 
the underlying tensions that is present in societies emerging from violent conflicts, 
between ‘on the one hand, the requirements of security and political stability in the 
short term and, on the other, policy objectives vital to long-term stability and 
‘sustainable peace’.’ The former include ‘physical security, the creation and 
stabilization of administrative and governing structures, and provision for the basic 
and life-sustaining needs of local populations’, objectives aimed at keeping the peace 
or a fragile peace process alive. The latter include issues ranging from ‘the 
administration of post-conflict justice, the disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of armed factions and combat against organized crime’ to ‘the broader 
aims of democratization and economic development.’ The tension between short and 
long-term objectives is, according to Berdal, highly context-specific. However, 
according to Berdal, even in the best circumstances, ‘a perfect reconciliation of long-
term objectives with the more immediate tasks of stabilization has proved hard to 
achieve’. Therefore, Berdal argues, ‘trade-offs, priority setting and awkward 
compromises between these sets of objectives simply cannot be avoided’.      
 
In recent years the term statebuilding has become closely associated with 
peacebuilding, both in practice and among scholars. In The Dilemmas of Statebuilding 
Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (2009:14-15) define postwar statebuilding as ‘the 
strengthening or construction of legitimate governmental institutions in countries that 
are emerging from conflicts.’ In their view, statebuilding is not synonymous with 
peacebuilding, as they define as ‘efforts to create conditions in which violence will not 
recur.’ Statebuilding is in their view a ‘sub-component of peacebuilding.’ They argue 
that ‘support for postwar statebuilding should be viewed as a call for paying greater 
attention to strengthening or constructing effective and legitimate governmental 
institutions as an important element of peacebuilding.’ In line with Berdal, they argue 
that the core-functions which need to be established in any post-conflict society are: 
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‘the provision of security, the rule of law (including a codified and promulgated body 
of laws with a reasonably effective police and justice system), [and] basic services.’ 
 
They claim that ‘post-conflict peacebuilding combines three separate yet simultaneous 
transitions: a social transition from internecine fighting to peace; a political transition 
from wartime government to postwar government; an economic transition from war-
warped accumulation and distribution to equitable, transparent postwar development 
that in turn reinforces peace.’ (Paris & Sisk 2009:1). 
 
Statebuilding, according to Paris and Sisk (2009:1-2), is a particular approach to 
peacebuilding, ‘premised on the recognition that achieving security and development 
in societies emerging from civil war partly depends on the existence of capable, 
autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions.’ They believe that earlier 
peacebuilding efforts relied ‘too heavily on quick fixes, while not paying enough 
attention to constructing institutional foundations for functioning postwar governments 
and markets’, and that international agencies, as a consequence, ‘began to reorient 
their peacebuilding strategies towards the construction of effective, legitimate 
governmental institutions in transitional states.’ 
 
Paris and Sisk (2009:3) argue that the ‘increased attention on statebuilding as a 
foundation for peacebuilding made good sense’, but they acknowledge that 
‘institutional strengthening, alone, would not produce peace and prosperity.’ However, 
they believe that ‘without adequate attention to the statebuilding requirements of 
peacebuilding, war-torn states would be less likely to escape the multiple and mutually 
reinforcing “traps” of violence and underdevelopment.’    
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In 2004, along with Roland Paris, several different writers arrived at similar 
conclusions on peacebuilding theory and practice, among them Francis Fukuyama, 
Simon Chesterman, James Fearon and David Laitin. These scholars all argued ‘that the 
operational concepts and implementation of peacebuilding had under-emphasized the 
creation or strengthening of governmental institutions as a foundation for successful 
transitions from war to peace.’ (Paris & Sisk 2009:7-8).   
 
Theirs and other publications resulted in a growing interest for statebuilding within the 
peacebuilding scholarship and among practitioners of peacebuilding. Statebuilding 
became an important part of the peacebuilding discourse. According to Paris and Sisk 
(2009:10-11), Lakhdar Brahimi assessed in 2007 that: 
‘The concept of statebuilding is becoming more and more accepted 
within the international community and is actually far more apt as a 
description of exactly what it is we should be trying to do in postconflict 
countries – building effective systems and institutions of government. 
Indeed, acceptance of statebuilding as a generic term to describe our 
activities will help to concentrate international support on those very 
activities.’  
 
Summarizing the sources above, it seems like there is a considerable agreement among 
scholars on peacebuilding that more attention is needed on constructing and supporting 
representative and independent state institutions. Statebuilding has become the main 
strategy for establishing post-conflict peace and stability in war-torn societies. 
However, the scholars seem to agree that the strategy of statebuilding is faced with a 
variety of challenges. How these challenges are managed is crucial for the outcome 
and success of modern peace- and statebuilding operations. 
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Even though the literature referred to mainly deals with larger UN-led peace 
operations with a high degree of outside intervention, the arguments are relevant. The 
international intervention in southern Serbia was characterized by a relative light 
footprint. The Yugoslav and Serb authorities were themselves responsible for the 
democratization of state institutions envisaged in the “Covic Plan”. Therefore, related 
to the critique of externally imposed democratization in post-conflict societies, one 
could assume that the nature of the international intervention would increase the 
chances of success.                
 
4.2 Policing in Peace Operations 
Several researchers see policing as a key security precondition for peace building. 
Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (2010:395-396) argue in Understanding 
Peacekeeping that ‘there has been a quantum leap in the role of policing in peace 
operations.’ They argue that ‘this reflects a shift from a Westphalian conception of the 
purpose of peace operations to a post-Westphalian view’, in which ‘there is a link 
between stable peace and the rule of law within domestic societies, and that 
peacekeepers ought to be in the business of establishing the rule of law and then 
building a sustainable capacity to maintain it in the long term.’ This view is related to 
liberal peace theory in which the relationship between representative, democratic 
institutions and peace is emphasized.  
 
Bellamy and Williams (2010:283) claim that there has been a radical transformation of 
the role of policing in peace operations. Up until the twenty-first century, policing was 
viewed as a peripheral part of operations and was usually limited to monitoring local 
police. However, they argue, with the recognition that military peacekeepers are often 
confronted with situations which they are not capable to deal with, as well as the 
growing influence of the idea that there is a positive connection between the rule of 
law and stable peace, there has been a great expansion of policing in peace operations. 
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According to Bellamy and Williams (2010:377), a defining characteristic of 
contemporary peace operations is that they play a greater part than earlier operations in 
the provision of public security and the rule of law. Thus, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the role of civilian policing in peace operations in the first decade of the 
twenty first century, and is now recognized as a core part of UN peace operations. 
 
Policing in peace operations began to change in the mid-1990s, as peacekeepers were 
tasked with facilitating the implementation of complex peace agreements and 
maintaining public security in the immediate aftermath of war. However, the police 
components typically remained limited to supervising and assisting the indigenous 
police forces. The key turning points came with the International Police Task Force 
deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and the role of policing in the transitional 
administrations in Kosovo and East Timor from 1999. Since then, the importance of 
the rule of law in peace operations has become widely accepted. This type of policing 
has expanded beyond transitional administrations into the wider sphere of peace 
operations. All UN peace operations since 2001 have been explicitly authorized to 
engage in rule of law or policing activities (Bellamy & Williams 2010:379-380). 
 
The main reason for this expansion of policing in peace operations is the growing 
recognition that the establishment of the rule of law is an important element in the 
transition from war to stable peace. The local police force is often best placed to deal 
with the problem when a crisis erupts. Relatively low-level crises can escalate rapidly 
into major problems that threaten governments or unravel peace processes in situations 
where local police services lack the capacity to tackle sporadic outburst of violence. 
Most contemporary analysts agree that ‘the rule of law is a key foundation of stable 
peace and that peace operations ought to be in the business of helping to establish it’. 
Moreover, military peacekeepers are often ill-suited in the long term to perform 
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policing tasks and capacity-building measures necessary to support the establishment 
of the rule of law (Bellamy & Williams 2010:380-381).  
 
This idea is based on the view that stable peace requires the transformation of states 
and societies along liberal democratic lines, an idea that has been widely taken up by 
the international community. The ‘obvious connection’ between stable peace and the 
rule of law was first recognized by Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace (Bellamy & 
Williams 2010:381). This growing recognition of the connection between the rule of 
law and stable peace was supported by two other factors. First, it was widely believed 
that in an interdependent world, security threats crossed borders. This gave particularly 
Western governments an incentive to ensure that other states were orderly and well 
governed. Second, it was widely acknowledged that successful economic development 
needs to be accompanied by measures to improve security. It was believed that 
economic development requires a basic degree of law and order which can in many 
cases only be achieved through external assistance (Bellamy & Williams 2010:382-
383). 
 
Bellamy and Williams (2010:386-387) divides policing operations into four main 
categories based on their different tasks and levels of authority: Capacity-building, 
Traditional policing, Multidimensional policing and Executive policing. At one end of 
the spectrum, international police officers advise and support local authorities but do 
not monitor them or perform policing functions. At the other end, in transitional 
administrations, the international police assume executive authority and conduct the 
full range of policing activities. In practice, however, most actual operations fit 
somewhere between the two poles.   
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Most relevant to the study of the multi-ethnic police reform in southern Serbia is 
Capacity-building. Most policing missions have a capacity-building element and aim 
to establish effective, legitimate and sustainable local police services. Typically, 
capacity building operations aim to ‘develop or modify the knowledge, skills, and 
character traits of police officers and support staff through a planned and systematic 
learning experience, thereby achieving effectiveness in a wide range of activities’. 
Capacity-building policing missions intend to ‘allow police staff to acquire abilities in 
order to perform given tasks to an adequate level or degree’. Also, they often attempt 
to use the police service as a vanguard for wider transformation by using the reform 
process as a ‘transmission mechanism’. The basic idea is that, in divided societies, 
reforms aimed at creating a multi-ethnic, gender-sensitive, democratic police service 
can have positive effects beyond their immediate impact on the police service itself, 
helping to embed these values within the wider society (Bellamy & Williams 
2010:387). 
 
Capacity-building covers a wide spectrum of activities designed to enhance the 
effectiveness of criminal investigations, the police service’s capacity to prevent and 
deal with civil unrest, and measures to improve the local police force’s accountability 
and compliance with international human rights norms. In practice, capacity-building 
includes training programs covering both practical policing issues and normative 
issues, for example democratic policing, human-rights and gender mainstreaming, the 
provision of equipment, planning and support for senior management, and the creation 
of systems of accountability such as transparent budgeting and accounting (Bellamy & 
Williams 2010:387). 
 
According to Bellamy and Williams (2010:389), capacity-building operations have 
had some success. However, they also confront some major problems. First, as stand-
alone missions, they are entirely dependent on the consent of the host government and 
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needs to cooperate closely with it. This can result in problems in situations where the 
host government does not enjoy a high degree of local legitimacy or where the police 
service is dominated by a particular ethnic group. Second, sustaining reforms and 
behavioral change in the long term has proved very difficult. This points, on the one 
hand, to a wider challenge with using the police as a ‘transmission mechanism’. If the 
values inculcated by police reform are not shared by the wider society and the political 
elite, they are unlikely to be sustained. On the other hand, there is the problem of 
treating the police in isolation from other elements of the criminal justice system. 
Third, by purging corrupt and abusive officers and disrupting key systems, police 
reform can actually reduce a police service’s capacity in the short term to fulfill their 
tasks. Finally, training can be quite haphazard in multinational operations where 
different national contingents are charged with different aspects of the mission. 
 
Summarized, policing has become an important element in all peace operations. The 
close relationship between the rule of law on the one hand and peace and stability on 
the other seems well established among both scholars and practitioners of 
peacebuilding. Establishing the rule of law is believed to be a precondition for 
economic development and the transition from conflict to lasting peace. This can be 
fulfilled either through the direct intervention of international police components or 
through constructing and supporting indigenous security institutions. Increasing the 
capacity of local police forces is present in almost all international police missions and 
is seen as an effective approach to strengthening the rule of law in societies emerging 
from conflict. Enhancing the capacity of local police forces often require thorough 
reform processes, sometimes completely altering the status quo within the local 
security apparatus. As with peace- and statebuilding operations in general, police 
missions are faced with a range of challenges that needs to be managed in order to 
succeed.      
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4.3 Police Reform 
Theory on police reform relates both to ‘normal’ policing and to policing activities in 
peace operations. The focus below will be on the latter and is derived from three 
articles on police reform in different parts of former Yugoslavia (Stodiek 2006, Ryan 
2007, Bieber 2010). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the three articles used in this part to 
introduce relevant theory on police reform also entirely contributes the empirical 
findings on multiethnic police reform in southern Serbia for the remainder of the 
thesis. Although dealing with police reform in general, all three articles emphasize 
aspects of police reform in southeastern Europe and in the Balkans in particular. 
Below, information from the three articles is presented in order to see what have been 
key features of the police reforms in this area.        
 
In The OSCE and the Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Forces in the Balkans, Thorsten 
Stodiek (2006:7) argues that ‘In order to re-establish the state’s legitimate monopoly of 
force (…) and to secure a sustainable peace process, citizens must be disarmed, the 
parties to the conflict demobilized and demilitarized, and the armed forces 
reconstituted.’ He emphasizes that this requires reforming, or even completely 
restructuring, the domestic police forces. Stodiek claims that ‘the (re-)established 
democratic police services must have both the ability and the will to prevent human 
rights violations, protect democratic institutions and resolutely fight corruption, 
organized crime and terrorism.’ 
 
According to Stodiek (2006:7-8), ‘the establishment of ethnically mixed police forces 
within multi-ethnic societies in the aftermath of violent conflicts presents a particular 
challenge for police reforms.’ He argues that ‘In an environment, which is 
characterized by ethnically motivated hatred and social mistrust, police forces must be 
constituted of members off all population groups. Otherwise the population or at least 
certain minority groups will have no confidence in the security forces.’ Stodiek argues 
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that ‘the key question (…) is whether and to what extent it is possible to unite 
members of antagonistic ethnic communities in one and the same police force, and to 
develop a spirit of professionalism and comradeship within these multi-ethnic units, 
without which effective co-operation is impossible.’ 
 
Stodiek (2006:8) claims that creating multiethnic police forces ‘does not take place in 
a socio-political vacuum and its mere existence does not guarantee its acceptance by 
all ethnic groups. Even if the police behave appropriately (…), some ethnic groups 
may need more time to gain confidence.’ He argues that ‘comprehensive and long-
lasting confidence-building programs such as “community policing” are necessary’ for 
this reason. The question for police reformers is, according to Stodiek, ‘whether to 
resort to existing experienced, but publicly discredited, police forces or to rely on the 
newly established police units that are trained to respect human rights, but are 
inexperienced in fighting crime.’ He claims that ‘without success in fighting crime, the 
police will not gain trust among the population and this may worsen the security 
situation in general.’ 
 
Stodiek (2006:10) highlights the fact that ‘local governments must have a sense of 
ownership if the reform process is to be successful.’ Unsupported reforms will not be 
sustainable. Also, police reform is a ‘sensitive issue for every government, because it 
“touches the heart of a state’s sovereignty and its monopoly of coercive means”.’ 
Resistance to reform may also come from within the police itself. Furthermore, 
Stodiek claims, ‘the reform process must be perceived as legitimate by the local 
population.’  
 
Florian Bieber (2010:3-4) argues in ‘Policing the Peace after Yugoslavia: Police 
Reform between External Imposition and Domestic Reform’ that ‘For their central role 
during conflicts police reform has been understood to be a pillar of post-conflict 
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reconstruction, not only in former Yugoslavia, but also in other ethnic and civil 
conflicts from Northern Ireland to Sudan.’ According to Bieber, ‘The reforms which 
are initiated in the post-conflict period have to meet six particular challenges’. First, 
they need to penalize and possibly remove police officers who have been involved in 
serious human rights breaches during the conflict. Second, ‘former combatants need to 
transition to civilian jobs’ and police forces are often the obvious alternative. Third, 
‘police forces need to be made more representative of the population, which in most 
cases involves increasing the share of minority members of the police force.’ Fourth, 
‘police reform is necessary in order for the return of minorities and to provide a secure 
environment in which democratic elections can take place.’ Fifth, ‘police reform is 
inherently political and often controversial as the structure of the police reinforces the 
political structures after the war. These institutions, such as regional autonomy, are 
often integral part of the peace settlement.’ Sixth, ‘policing practices need to be 
professionalized and reformed.’ All these aspects ‘seek to transform police forces from 
a cause of conflict to a legitimate representative of an inclusive state to maintain 
peace’, but ‘the different priorities often pull the reform efforts into contradictory 
directions.’ 
 
In the form of assistance, advice, policing, mentoring, training, enforcement and 
coercion, international intervention shaped the evolution of post-conflict policing in 
former Yugoslavia. Bieber labels the effort to reform police in southern Serbia as 
short-term post-conflict police reform, which includes ‘measures that have assisted 
governments to reform police forces in response to a conflict.’ (Bieber 2010:4). 
According to Bieber (2010:12), this is a relatively light form of international assistance 
and consists of a ‘set of measures to address the ethnic composition of the police in the 
post-conflict context.’ In the immediate aftermath of conflict, police forces tend to be 
unrepresentative of the wider population. Minorities in particular, especially if they 
were a part of the conflict, ‘are usually reduced to a few token representatives, if at 
all.’ This challenge was confronted by all police forces across former Yugoslavia and 
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therefore became a core feature of all international efforts in the region. Bieber 
(2010:12) argues:  
‘A particular challenge of increasing the number of police officers from 
minority communities is the tension with some long-term reform goals. 
The quick increase of minority members in the police force often does 
not facilitate the professionalism of the police, but might crucially 
enhance the legitimacy of the police which takes priority in an 
environment of low trust after conflict.’  
 
In “Quasi-pluralism in a Quasi-peace: South Serbia’s Multi-ethnic Police”, Barry Ryan 
(2007:282-283) argues that one particular understanding of the role of the police in 
society is that the police are seen as primarily involved with maintaining a particular 
form of order. This implies that sub-cultures, or minority communities, perceived as 
being outside or contrary to this particular form of order, are often treated as a threat 
and ‘policed differently than the majority.’ This may increase the solidarity in the 
minority group and separates it from the majority.  
 
Ryan (2007:283) argues that Community-oriented Policing (COP) ‘has become the 
mechanism through which the democratization of local policing has been presented to 
several post-conflict and transitional regions.’ COP seeks ‘to alter asymmetrical power 
relations between the police and the public by utilizing tactics that construct consensus 
for policing priorities and by focusing on the citizen’s most pressing concerns.’ COP is 
usually associated with foot patrols and increased interaction between citizens and 
police officers. The ‘concept entails the creation of facilitating structures to enhance 
cooperation between the police and the public’ and consultation is a key feature. 
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Summarized, police reform is an important part of the capacity-building element in 
policing missions. In order to establish rule of law in post-conflict societies, it is often 
necessary to reform the existing local police forces. The police may in many cases 
have been parts in the conflicts the international intervention seek to end. This is often 
the case in intra-state ethnic conflicts. Thus, police reform often includes the 
(re)integration of minorities and former combatants into the reformed police 
structures, the removal of elements within the police who has been engaged in human-
rights abuses, and making the reformed police more professional and representative of 
the wider population. The aim of multiethnic police reform is to establish legitimate 
local institutions capable of maintaining a safe and secure environment fostering 
lasting peace and stability. Introducing community-oriented policing (COP) is a 
strategy for building confidence in the police among the local population. COP implies 
a close relationship between the police and population, between ‘the police’ and ‘the 
policed’, the latter having a say in the conduct of the former through close contact and 
dialogue.           
 
4.4 Summary of Theoretical Concepts 
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, there is a close relationship between the 
main presented above. Since the end of the Cold War, peacebuilding has been closely 
associated with statebuilding. Constructing and supporting local governing institutions 
capable of providing a safe and secure environment may be viewed as a condition for a 
successful transition from conflict to peace and stability in war-torn societies. This 
belief is based on the view that stable peace requires the transformation of states and 
societies along liberal democratic lines.  
 
Along with the increased focus on the statebuilding aspect of peacebuilding, policing 
became an important element in the majority of peace operations. Police components 
in modern peace operations take different shapes and forms, but capacity-building is 
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an element in most of them. The international community seeks through their 
relatively soft intervention to enhance the capability and capacity of the local police 
structure to provide for a safe and secure environment. This often requires reform of 
the already existing police structures, as the police in many cases has been part of the 
conflict the international community seeks to end. Introducing community-oriented 
policing (COP) programs is a strategy for reforming the police apparatus in divided 
societies emerging from conflict. 
 
Multiethnic police reform was a crucial part of the “Covic-Plan” ending the hostilities 
in southern Serbia in 2001. Furthermore, the international community played an 
important role in facilitating and implementing the police reforms set out in the peace 
settlement. As such it appears to be a peacebuilding measure as described in the 
theories discussed above. The remainder of the thesis will examine and discuss the 
establishment and conduct of the multiethnic police force and assess to what extent it 
actually contributed to peace and stability in the Presevo Valley.          
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5. Findings and Analysis 
To be able to fully answer the research question, whether the multiethnic police 
contributed to peace in the Presevo Valley, it is necessary to analyze the establishment 
and performance of the multiethnic police as well as the perception of it among the 
local populace. This chapter will conduct such an analysis by asking a number of 
questions which again feed into the main research question. The first part, dealing with 
the mandate for the multiethnic police and the plan for its implementation, asks how 
central the establishment of the multiethnic police was for reaching an agreement on 
the “Covic Plan” and how the Serbs and Albanians differed in their opinions on this 
issue. The second part, on recruitment, training and field duty tasks of the multiethnic 
police, asks how the recruitment process affected their quality, whether the training 
provided was adequate, how the field duty influenced their professionalism and level 
of integration with the regular security apparatus, and if the multiethnic police ever 
became the main security provider in the Presevo Valley. The third part asks whether 
the introduction of community-oriented policing (COP) programs was a success. The 
fourth part, on the local perception of security and the reform efforts, asks how the 
inhabitants of southern Serbia assess their security situation, how they perceive the 
results of the police reforms and how they judge the conduct of the multiethnic police. 
The fifth part summarizes the findings and analysis, based on the main arguments and 
conclusions of the three contributing articles, and asks how their assessments differ 
with regards to the level of success of the multiethnic police and the reforms 
associated with it. 
 
5.1 Mandate and Plan 
As described in Chapter 3, the “Covic Plan” included elements of security sector 
reform. The introduction of a multiethnic police force was a vital part of the reform 
process. How central was the establishment of the multiethnic police for the agreement 
of the “Covic plan”? What was the level of agreement between the Serbs and 
Albanians on these matters?  
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Stodiek (2006:43-44) claims that the mandate for the multi-ethnic police is found in 
one of the objectives in the “Covic Plan”. Multiethnic police units were to be 
established, composed of a number of experienced Serbian and former Albanian police 
officers and 400 new police officers, of which more than half would be ethnic 
Albanians. The new police officers were to be trained at the police academy in 
Mitrovo Polje in three phases by May 2002. The OSCE Mission to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (OMiFRY) was to provide training for this new Multi-Ethnic 
Police Element (MEPE) and offered 32 trainers. The first phase of training was to 
consist of three five-day refresher courses for 40 former Albanian and Serbian officers 
in order to enable the first multi-ethnic police patrols to be operative quickly. The 
second phase, designed for new recruits, included 12 weeks of basic police training 
followed by 16 weeks of field training, delivered by Serbian instructors. The start of 
phase 1 was set tentatively at 21 May 2001. 
 
According to Ryan (2007:286), the first meeting between representatives of the 
international community, ethnic Albanians and the Serbian Coordination Body 
occurred on 30 March 2001. Chaired by a NATO representative, these talks, 
concerned with demilitarization, release of hostages and the formation of an ethnically 
mixed police force, resulted in little besides agreement on the necessity of talks on the 
establishment of mixed police training. Although a number of obstacles existed, both 
the Albanian and Serb side agreed in principle with the concept of joint police patrols 
in subsequent meetings. Ryan argues that ‘This exercise of negotiating the 
composition and aims of the multi-ethnic police had a major impact on the end of the 
conflict. Both parties agreed that policing in the region occupied common ground for 
discussions.’ 
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Both parties agreed that multi-ethnic forces were imperative for stability in the region, 
to cooperate on a plan for the creation of multi-ethnic police patrols and that 
candidates for selection could not have been involved in terrorist or criminal activity. 
There were also areas of disagreement. The Serbian authorities wanted to retain a high 
degree of control over the training process, while the Albanians wanted the 
international community to administer the selection, recruitment and training of the 
multi-ethnic police officers. The Albanians feared that candidates would be arrested 
when they showed up for interviews. They also believed that the whole initiative was 
only temporary and therefore ‘needed to be institutionalized into a longer-term 
strategy for the region’ and that the multi-ethnic police officers needed to be fully 
integrated with regular police structures. The Albanians were concerned that potential 
Albanian candidates lacked the requisite level of education required by the MoI. The 
Serbs were afraid that potential ‘terrorists’ could get the opportunity to infiltrate their 
security structures. An agreement on these issues was ‘reached in the spirit of what Dr. 
Nebosja Covic termed ‘reconciliation and dialogue’, and a public call for candidates 
was made by the MoI on 29 May 2001.’(Ryan 2007:286). 
 
Summed up, Both Serbs and Albanians agreed on the need for reforming the security 
sector during initial talks in the spring of 2001. The introduction of multiethnic police 
units was seen as a precondition for stability in the region. Including the element of 
multiethnic police reform in the initial peace negotiations enabled the parts to reach an 
agreement on other issues. As such, it can be argued that the comprehensive Konjulj 
Agreement ending the hostilities in the Presevo Valley was premised on multiethnic 
police reform. The mandate for the establishment of the multiethnic police was found 
in the objectives of the “Covic Plan”. The new multiethnic unit was to consist of 
experienced and newly recruited officers of both Serb and Albanian ethnicity. Initially, 
there were disagreements between the parties with regards to who should be 
responsible for recruitment and training. However, a compromise was reached on 
these issues and the OSCE was charged with providing training and mentoring.     
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5.2 Recruitment, Training and Field Duty  
Implementing police reform and establishing the multiethnic police force required 
recruitment and training of new officers. Reforming existing police practices also 
required educating experienced officers. After completing training, the multiethnic 
police officers were put on duty throughout southern Serbia. How did the recruitment 
process affect the quality of the multiethnic police? Was the training provided 
adequate for making the multiethnic police into a reliable security actor? How did the 
field duties of the multiethnic police influence their level of professionalism and 
integration with the regular security apparatus? Was the multiethnic police ever 
enabled to become the main security provider in the Presevo Valley?   
 
To be eligible for recruitment, multiethnic police cadets had to be between 20 and 27 
years old, have secondary school education, be in good physical and mental health and 
have no criminal record. More than 500 candidates applied by August 2001. The 
UCPMB insisted on the incorporation of its former members and a compromise was 
reached in which former UCPMB fighters would ‘neither be preferentially treated nor 
rejected.’ Serbian representatives claim that 30 per cent of the Albanian officers were 
former UCPMB fighters, while the Albanian side insists that only five per cent of the 
Albanian officers were former fighters (Stodiek 2006:44). 
 
The OSCE trained police officers in a three-stage model. Short five day and five week 
refresher courses were aimed at former police officers, including Albanians who had 
been dismissed or resigned during the Milosevic era. These courses sought to quickly 
signaling change and to build confidence and were based on training equal numbers of 
Serbs and Albanians (Bieber 2010:13). The first two training phases, run by five 
OSCE instructors and supported by two Serbian instructors, was completed by sixty 
Albanian and Serbian officers in July 2001. The first ethnically mixed police teams 
had already started patrolling in May the same year. The twelve-week academy 
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training started in August 2001. Lessons included general policing, operational police 
skills, firearms- and tactical training. The training curriculum was basically copied 
from that of at the OSCE police academy in Kosovo, and the academy was run by an 
OSCE police instructor in co-operation with a Serbian representative from the MoI. 34 
Serbs and 64 Albanians took part in this first course. By July 2002, 253 Albanians, 128 
Serbs, two Roma and three cadets of other minorities had completed and graduated 
from four basic training courses (Stodiek 2006:44-46).  
 
The twelve-week basic training received pretty good ratings in a CORE survey of 
October 2004. The suitability of the local cadets was assessed differently by former 
OSCE instructors. Educational deficits and a lack of professional attitude, in part due 
to the politicization of the cadets were seen as the biggest deficits (Stodiek 2006:44-
46). 
 
The 16-week field training was conducted by Serbian police officers on the job as 
MEPE officers were to be incorporated into existing police structures. However, the 
MEPE officers were mostly deployed in groups of six or eight to police containers, 
mostly located in remote areas, where they did not receive any relevant and adequate 
field training. The training did not afford any opportunity to practice or apply the 
newly learned skills. The standing of the MEPE officers was pretty low amongst their 
colleagues, who themselves had undergone the regular six-month basic training 
(Stodiek 2006:46). 
 
Starting in April 2002, in an effort to improve the poor policing skills of the MEPE 
officers, the OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (OMiFRY) offered 
a follow-up course for MEPE officers as part of the Modern Policing Course, already 
developed for the entire Serbian police. By December 2002, over 600 officers from 
South Serbia had participated in this course. The OSCE mission, now renamed OSCE 
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Mission to Serbia and Montenegro (OMiSaM), provided police officers in South 
Serbia with an additional Police Development Program in 2003. By 2004, a total of 
620 officers had been re-trained in one-week courses to improve their policing skills 
(Stodiek 2006:46). 
 
OMiSaM provided a six-week Trainer Development Program in 2003 and 2004 for 98 
Serbian officers, around ten coming from South Serbia, in order to enhance field 
training and mentoring in Serbia. The mission also reassigned three police trainers to 
the Presevo Valley to improve in-service training and community policing in the 
region. In 2004 OMiSaM and the Serbian authorities established the South Serbia 
Working Group, comprised of the mayors and police chiefs of the three municipalities, 
police officials from Vranje and Leskovac, and representatives of the MoI, the 
Coordination Body and the OSCE. The initial focus was on an in-service training 
program conducted by Serbian instructors who had passed the Development Trainer 
Program. The OSCE and the Serbian MoI jointly conducted a training needs 
assessment and developed a training curriculum. Community policing and police 
management were high on the agenda. The training started in March 2005 (Stodiek 
2006:46-47).   
 
Taking stock of the establishment of the multiethnic police force, Stodiek (2006:50) 
argues that with the completion of the basic training courses in June 2002, OMiFRY 
had achieved its goal with respect to the number of officers recruited and trained. With 
a total of 280 Albanian officers, their share did not fully correspond to the percentage 
of Albanians within the south Serbian population as envisaged in the “Covic Plan”. 
According to the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Albanian police 
representation in Medvedja, where Albanians made up 26.17 per cent of the 
population, was 12.1 per cent in 2002. In Bujanovac, 40 per cent of the police officers 
were Albanian, while 54.69 per cent of the general population was Albanians. In 
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Presevo, where Albanians constituted 89.1 per cent of the entire population, only 50 
per cent, (according to ICG only 30 per cent) of the police officers were Albanians. 
But compared to the mere handful of Albanian officers in the three municipalities 
before May 2001, the development represented a great improvement. Presevo had an 
Albanian Chief of Police, while the positions as Deputy Chief of Police in Medvedja 
and Bujanovac were held by Albanians. The Albanian community was consulted 
during the appointment process for these positions. 
 
Most MEPE officers were deployed in small ethnically mixed teams in 40 newly 
established police containers within or in the vicinity of Albanian and ethnically mixed 
villages in the Presevo Valley. Some worked at fixed police stations in towns. Three 
years after the beginning of the first training course, both the OSCE and Serbian MoI 
stressed that all MEPE officers had been incorporated into the structures of the regular 
Serbian police. Therefore, they claimed, the term MEPE was no longer appropriate. 
However, the tasks of the officers deployed in containers were restricted to their own 
force protection, foot patrolling and manning the radios, which had a negative effect 
on the development of their general policing skills. This made established and 
experienced Serbian officers assess that the MEPE units were “a largely separate and 
less capable entity”. Furthermore, no Albanian officers had been promoted since the 
beginning of the training. This was justified by the MoI with the lack of higher 
education of most Albanian officers and their lack of work experience (Stodiek 
2006:50-51). 
 
Stodiek (2006:51) argues that there has been a lack of cooperation between Serbian 
Gendarmerie and the multi-ethnic police, an ‘issue that contradicts the assertion that 
the MEPE officers have been integrated into Serbian police structures.’ There was an 
obvious mistrust on behalf of the Gendarmerie towards the MEPE. The exclusion of 
the MEPE from search operations in Albanian-dominated municipalities represents a 
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‘missed opportunity for building confidence among the ethnic minority population in 
the state security organs.’ As a step towards genuine integration of the multi-ethnic 
units into the regular police force, the OSCE pushed for the reduction and 
consolidation of the MEPE containers and the establishment of more permanent sub-
stations, in which the multi-ethnic police could carry out similar functions as in the 
main police stations and “have the capacity to develop local initiatives to prevent 
crime and undertake criminal investigations.” These changes would also result in a 
normalization of career development and rotation of staff between the sub-stations and 
main police stations. As a consequence, the Serbian authorities started reducing the 
number of containers by late spring 2005. 
 
According to Ryan (2007:287), 455 officers had been trained by 27 June 2002. The 
multi-ethnic officers were deployed to their place of residence ‘creating, on paper at 
least, a far more pluralist structure in local policing institutions.’ The multi-ethnic 
police officers became highly visible symbols of a new approach to local policing in 
southern Serbia, operating out of blue containers and wearing distinctive uniforms. 
Ryan argues that ‘they were so symbolic of Albanian-Serb cooperation that they 
quickly became targets for militant ethnic Albanian factions.’ Their distinctiveness 
also served to differentiate them from the regular police. According to Ryan, one 
report states that ‘ethnic Albanian communities continued to perceive the Gendarmerie 
and regular police as the real police, as they carried out most security tasks and arrests, 
while ‘the multi-ethnic police are assigned more mundane tasks of day-to-day policing 
and border duties’.’ Not a single multi-ethnic officer had received a promotion after 
two years in the field. This was explained by the MoI by the inadequate education 
levels of many of the Albanian members of the multi-ethnic police. An OSCE 
assessment concluded that the working conditions and the limited responsibilities 
given to the multi-ethnic police officers rendered them little opportunities to develop 
their policing skills. 
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Ryan (2007:288) claims that an assault in Bujanovac in 2004 on multi-ethnic police 
officers attempting to arrest three Albanians illustrates that they had gained little 
popular authority. According to Ryan, multi-ethnic officers were rescued by 
Gendarmerie when they were threatened by angry Albanians at a checkpoint. Ryan 
had also observed heavily armed Gendarmerie in close proximity while visiting a 
multi-ethnic police container in August 2003. This had prompted him to conclude that 
the Gendarmerie was deployed to protect the multi-ethnic police unit. According to 
Ryan, this may have been necessary due to ‘incessant threats’ against the multi-ethnic 
officers made from former commanders of the UCPMB in February 2003. 
Surprisingly, according to Ryan, ‘only two multi-ethnic police officers ever resigned, 
even though up to 75 per cent of the unit may have been threatened.’ 
 
Ryan (2007:288) argues that ‘the failure to integrate the multi-ethnic policing element 
into the greater policing structure de-legitimized it significantly’. Ryan argues that this 
may be the result of a lack of trust in the multi-ethnic police officers by the Serbian 
MoI, who believed that the multi-ethnic police was strongly influenced by former 
UCPMB commanders. 
 
According to Ryan (2007:289-290), it was ‘universally acknowledged that multi-
ethnic policing was not living up to their expectations.’ Although the introduction of 
multi-ethnic police officers represented an achievement, an interview revealed that 
they ‘had so far failed to impress.’ They were perceived as ‘passive observers of 
everything … who didn’t have the authority to do anything and were unable to do 
anything concrete’ by one respondent. The same respondent complained that they 
spent too much time in their containers and did not patrol or have any contact with the 
citizens. According to Ryan, other respondents agreed with this view; ‘the multi-ethnic 
police are put in a situation that they can do nothing. They just walk around. They 
cannot do anything nor can they protect anyone’. Another respondent explained that 
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they were ‘ordinary citizens who have a uniform – they have limited authority’. Yet 
another respondent remarked that when they ‘get more authority and power they will 
prove themselves in the field and gain the trust of the citizens. Naturally, if they 
remain in the containers, doing nothing but sit and watch they will not gain the trust of 
the citizens.’ 
 
Summarizing the findings above, it is fair to argue that the recruitment, training and 
field duty of the multiethnic police force affected their level of quality in a negative 
way. First, the recruitment process was carried out according to plan, but many of the 
new recruits were lacking necessary qualifications. This may indicate that quantity was 
prioritized over quality. However, the increased number of Albanian officers did 
represent an improvement. The training phases were also carried out as planned, both 
by instructors from the OSCE and the MoI. But the training provided did not result in 
the desired level of qualifications for the multiethnic police officers. This may be due 
to inadequate training programs and the new recruit’s pre-training level of education. 
The insufficient training could have been compensated with effective on-the-job-
training when the newly trained officers were put on active duty. However, the 
majority of the multiethnic police officers were deployed to police containers where 
they did not get the chance to increase their capabilities. The poor professional quality 
of the multiethnic police officers made it undesirable for the regular police to be more 
closely integrated with the multiethnic units. This lack of integration resulted in a 
situation where the multiethnic police was viewed as a separate and second-rate 
security actor in the Presevo Valley. As a consequence, security continued to be 
provided by the regular police, the Gendarmerie and the Army.          
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5.3 Community-Oriented Policing   
Community-oriented policing (COP) programs were introduced in southern Serbia in 
order to democratize the security sector and build confidence between the local 
population and the multiethnic police. COP was supposed to make the police more 
representative of the general population, removing the barriers that had existed 
between them. This was meant to be done by creating local institutions where the 
populace could influence police policies. But did COP succeed in what it was intended 
to achieve?   
 
Ryan (2007:282-283) holds that the work done by the OSCE in South Serbia illustrates 
the difficulties involved in implementing confidence-building strategies to achieve de-
securitization. According to Ryan, the ‘OSCE sought to alter both the composition and 
the modus operandi of local policing’ in order to normalize politics in the region. ‘The 
reforms were based on the premise that the introduction of community-oriented 
policing (COP) would facilitate the democratization of the local security apparatus.’ 
 
Ryan (2007:291-292) claims that community-oriented policing had always been 
considered to be part of a wider plan to democratize policing in southern Serbia. In 
June 2003 the OSCE drew up provisional plans to initiate COP and to address the 
shortcomings of the multi-ethnic police. The plan centered on the ‘development of 
concrete community policing initiatives which, where necessary, should result in a 
change of policing policy and methodology’ and aimed at establishing Community 
Advisory Groups (CAGs) in the three municipalities. The plan also envisaged work on 
‘improving the reputation of multi-ethnic policing through further training in order to 
provide a more effective law enforcement resource in the region.’ The multi-ethnic 
units should be given more active roles in police activities. However, instead of 
pushing the MoI into incorporating the multi-ethnic units into the regular police 
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structures, the OSCE wanted to improve their credentials by placing them at the center 
of their COP plan. 
 
A hierarchy of structures to facilitate the implementation of COP was devised which 
aimed to utilize civil society to support the police, drawing heavily on British models. 
This model assumes that the goals of civil society are in harmony with the goals of the 
police and surrenders very little control to civil society over the actions and policies of 
the police. Ryan (2007:292) argues that the fact that representatives of the Serbian and 
ethnic Albanian civil society disagree fundamentally on the role of security in the 
region, even though agreeing on the need for more control over a more locally 
accountable police, makes the applicability of COP to southern Serbia questionable. 
According to Ryan (2007:292), ‘the Covic Plan had not progressed beyond its policing 
element, and there was no indication that the necessary socioeconomic reforms to fund 
and contextualize COP were about to be implemented.’ 
 
As a part of COP, Community Advisory Groups (CAGs) were to be established at the 
village/neighborhood level in order to facilitate dialogue between community 
members and police. Nearly 70 per cent of the villages in southern Serbia had either 
created, or were in the process of creating, CAGs as of August 2004. It was believed 
that the CAGs could be further empowered it they were to address issues related to 
community safety. With respect to re-integrating the police with civil society, it was 
envisaged that the CAGs ‘should also be engaged in providing oversight of police 
activities, enhancing community participation in police decision-making, encouraging 
the police to be more responsive and responsible, creating ownership on the part of the 
community and fostering good police-community relations’ (Ryan 2007:292). 
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The introduction of Community Policing Officers (CPOs) was proposed by the OSCE 
to address the concern expressed over the effectiveness of multi-ethnic policing and 
their relationship with the local community. These officers were to be deployed to link 
the 40 multi-ethnic police containers with the surrounding villages and to provide 
information to police chiefs at the municipal level. Consolidation of the number of 
police containers and the construction of more permanent police sub-stations in their 
place was also planned (Ryan 2007:292-293). 
 
At the municipal level it was proposed to establish Municipal Safety Councils (MSCs) 
to be headed by the local mayor. Civil society would be included in a sub-group, the 
Consultative Group, which would have an advisory function. Through consultations 
the MSCs would define local safety issues and advise the mayor on the allocations of 
funding, while having no decision-making power over the municipal budget (Ryan 
2007:293). 
 
The MSCs, according to the OSCE plan, would be accountable to a Municipal 
Assembly Security Committee (MASC), which would be a part of the municipal 
assembly and composed of its local assembly members. The MASC should be the 
oversight body for local policing. According to the OSCE plan, ‘MASC cannot 
appoint local police chiefs nor exercise control over operational activities of the police 
service’, but ‘citizen’s representatives have the right to ask questions about police 
activities in their constituency’. The MASC could raise funds and allocate them as 
needed based upon an evaluation of local police needs and the central government’s 
ability to address them. However, the OSCE plans did not indicate from where the 
funds would come. The police had no legal obligation to participate in these bodies 
(Ryan 2007:293). 
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Rather than pushing for incorporating them into regular policing structures, the OSCE 
put the multi-ethnic police units at the center of a policy to institute COP. According to 
Ryan (2007:294), ‘The primary problem [with this approach] was that it envisaged 
institutionally weak local committees negotiating with a centrally controlled police 
force to influence local security priorities.’ Further, he argues, ‘Essentially 
consultative bodies with little or no authority over the police, the various bodies were 
given limited power to question and receive answers from the police but were not 
empowered to influence police policies’ and the police themselves had no legal 
obligations to attend the meetings. Also, the local civil society was only given an 
advisory role. Ryan (2007:295) argues that ‘It is difficult to envisage these security 
committees generating the requisite transformation of policing in the region.’ 
 
The introduction of COP in southern Serbia was an attempt to democratize the security 
sector through building confidence between the local population and the multiethnic 
police. However, the establishment of the various structures on different levels in the 
municipalities did not have the desired outcome. The local population did not get to 
influence police policies because of the low level of decision-making power within the 
institutions established as a part of COP. The lack of success for COP as a confidence 
building measure was definitively also a result of the low qualifications of the 
multiethnic police units.        
 
5.4 Local Perception of Security and Reform Efforts 
The establishment of the multiethnic police may be viewed as a strategy for building 
confidence between the police and the local population in southern Serbia. The level of 
confidence relies on the population’s perception of safety and security as well as on 
their perception of the multiethnic police and its conduct. It can be argued that 
building confidence between the police and the population is as important as 
combating crime. Confidence is arguably a precondition for an effective police force. 
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How did the inhabitants of southern Serbia assess their security situation? How did 
they perceive the results of the police reforms and how did they judge the conduct of 
the multiethnic police?   
 
Citing research conducted in the Presevo Valley in 2004, Stodiek (2006:52) argues 
that one third of the Serbs and 40.8 per cent of the Albanians felt unsafe in their 
respective municipalities. Also, only about a half of each ethnic group (52.8 per cent 
of the Albanians and 45.5 per cent of the Serbs) felt that their property was secure. 
However, in another poll, done on behalf of the OSCE and the MoI, a clear majority of 
the respondents in the municipalities did not mention serious crimes as posing the 
biggest problems in South Serbia. 
 
In another survey conducted by the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the 
Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2003, inhabitants of Presevo, Bujanovac 
and Medvedja assessed the different factors threatening general security in South 
Serbia. 53 per cent of Serbs said that general security was not threatened, while only 
15 per cent of Albanians shared this view. Among the Albanian respondents, 43 per 
cent felt that general security was most threatened by the Serbian Gendarmerie, 
followed by 14 per cent who identified the military as a threatening factor. Among the 
Serb respondents, on the other hand, neither mentioned the Gendarmerie or the army 
as threatening factors but focused on terrorism and inter-ethnic conflicts (Stodiek 
2006:52). 
 
In the same survey, both Serbian and Albanian respondents assessed the situation with 
respect to their personal security as significantly more positive. For the Albanians, the 
Gendarmerie posed as the biggest threat, while the Serbs focused on crime and 
corruption. Comparing the security situation of 2003 with that of a year before, half of 
the Albanian respondents said it had improved and pointed to the introduction of the 
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multiethnic police as a major contributing factor. 60 per cent of the Serb respondents 
said the security situation had remained the same, while 25 per cent said it had 
improved. Only nine percent of the Albanian respondents and seven per cent of the 
Serbs assessed the security situation as worse compared to the year before (Stodiek 
2006:52-53). 
 
As all the articles seems to agree on, multiethnic police officers received insufficient 
field training and had few opportunities to develop general policing skills by on-the-
job training. Therefore, their policing skills were rated rather low among both locals 
and representatives of the international community. Multiethnic police officers, both 
Serbs and Albanians, appeared to be far less experienced than their colleagues in the 
regular police. According to one police chief, a number of Albanians selected should 
not be serving in the police, because they had only been included to protect Albanian 
interests. In his view, 50 per cent of the officers were unsuitable and needed a lot more 
training. This rather negative assessment was not shared by the officers themselves. 
The relative majority (44.5 per cent) said that all or more than 90 per cent of the 
officers were suitable for police work (Stodiek 2006:53). 
 
According to the Serbian Humanitarian Law Center (HLC), there have been no 
‘serious incidents of police misconduct against members of ethnic communities since 
the fall of Milosevic’. The relations between Albanians and the police have improved 
significantly in Serbia. The HLC considered the ‘frequency with which police officers 
continue to use excessive force during identity checks, arrests, detention in police 
stations, and investigatory interrogations’ to be the most pressing human rights 
problem. The Albanian population in South Serbia continued to complain particularly 
about the discriminatory and menacing behavior of the Gendarmerie (Stodiek 
2006:54). 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
In 2004, the Albanian population in Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja was more 
enthusiastic about the performance of the multiethnic police than were the Serbs. 
While 64.2 per cent of the Albanians rated their performance as good or excellent, 
only 39 per cent of the Serbs felt the same. Only 5.7 per cent of the Albanians rated 
their performance as poor, compared to 24.3 per cent of the Serbs (Stodiek 2006:55-
56). 
 
A clear majority of the Serbian respondents (69 per cent) preferred that the MUP, the 
Army and/or the Gendarmerie should be responsible for the security in the region. 
Only two per cent of the Serbs preferred the multiethnic police. In contrast, 24 per cent 
of the Albanians preferred the multi-ethnic police. However, the majority of the 
inhabitants of southern Serbia felt that the police had reformed since 2001. Albanians 
appreciated the effects of reform more than the Serbs did. The respondents believed 
that the behavior of the police had visibly improved since the introduction of police 
reform, although more needed to be done (Stodiek 2006:56). 
 
While 59.4 per cent of the citizens of South Serbia stressed that they would be willing 
to cooperate with the police in solving problems in their community, there was still a 
significant percentage (40.6 per cent) of the correspondents who were unwilling to do 
so. The introduction of ethnically mixed patrols had led to a significant increase of 
trust in the police and the willingness to cooperate with it (Stodiek 2006:57). 
 
Unlike the ethnic Albanian population, ethnic Serbs view the multi-ethnic units with 
much skepticism. The acceptance of these units is also rather low within the regular 
police apparatus, most visibly expressed by the inadequate integration of these units 
into existing structures. Cooperation between multi-ethnic units and special police 
forces tasked with fighting organized crime and terrorism continuous to be difficult 
(Stodiek 2006:83). 
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Ryan (2007:290) claims that Serbs and Roma respondents ‘were far more disparaging 
of multi-ethnic policing that were ethnic Albanians, who seemed to view it as a flawed 
idea with potential.’ Generally, the Serbs in southern Serbia ‘viewed reform as a 
concession benefitting ethnic Albanians.’ Both Serb and Roma respondents answered 
that ‘nobody gained from its introduction’ when asked if they identified themselves 
with the multiethnic police. The compromises allowing ethnic Albanians to join the 
police enabled Serb respondents to articulate their lack of trust in the multiethnic 
police. One respondent questioned their qualifications, while another accused it of 
being ‘composed of criminals and terrorists.’ Another questioned their loyalty, arguing 
that ‘we do not know under whose authority they are’. Serb and Roma respondents 
alike were ‘critical of multi-ethnic policing at a structural level, considering the 
concept valid but its implementation problematic.’ Multi-ethnic policing was not 
directly listed by Serb and Roma respondents as a particular achievement, while 
Albanian respondents considered it as ‘an improvement, albeit a flawed one, on past 
practices.’ 
 
Both Albanian and Serb respondents ‘expressed concerns about the limitations of the 
role of multi-ethnic units.’ Their limited range of active tasks ‘proved to locals that the 
unit was largely dysfunctional.’ According to Ryan (2007:291), ‘The inability or 
unwillingness of multi-ethnic policing to perform effectively was a source of 
dissatisfaction to people in southern Serbia’. Ryan (2007:291) argues that such 
observations illustrate that:  
‘the importance of multi-ethnic police as a confidence-building measure 
declined with the stabilization of the region, and that the seemingly 
symbolic function of the force needed to be altered in order to both 
improve the effectiveness of the force’s contribution to local safety 
matters and to enhance its levels of public confidence.’ 
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Summarizing the findings above, a significant number of both Serbs and Albanians 
felt unsafe in their municipalities in 2004, albeit for different reasons. Large portions 
of the Albanians continued to view the Gendarmerie and the Army as threats to their 
security, while the Serbs continued to fear terrorism and inter-ethnic violence. This is 
clearly an indication that old grievances were present among both ethnicities. The 
Serbs maintained that the security situation had remained static, while the Albanians 
believed that it had improved due to the establishment of the multiethnic police. The 
Albanians seemed to be more enthusiastic about the performance of the multiethnic 
police and appreciative of the reform effort than the Serbs, who still preferred the 
MUP, the Gendarmerie or the Army being responsible for their security. The 
Albanians felt a higher degree of confidence in the multiethnic police than the Serbs 
did. However, both ethnicities seem to agree that the limited operational capability of 
the multiethnic police was a reason for concern.  
 
5.5 Summary of Findings and Analysis 
The information and findings above is derived from three different sources. It is fair to 
assume that they have arrived at different conclusions. To what extent did they differ 
with regards to their assessments of the level of success of the multiethnic police and 
the reforms associated with it? How did they assess the effectiveness of the 
recruitment process, the quality of the training provided and the level of integration 
between the multiethnic police and the regular security apparatus? How did they assess 
the multiethnic police as a mechanism for building confidence between the population 
and police?   
 
Thorsten Stodiek’s (2006:59-60) main arguments are that the establishment of 
multiethnic police units and their deployment in southern Serbia led to a significant 
increase in confidence in the local police among large segments of the population. 
However, Serbs and Albanians alike are skeptical about the policing skills of many 
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multiethnic police officers. Their operational inadequacies are a result of the in-service 
training provided by the Serbian authorities, particularly for officers stationed in police 
containers. Stodiek claims that a lot remains to be done with respect to the integration 
of the multiethnic police elements into the regular police force. Likewise, structural 
deficiencies inherited from communist and Milosevic era, such as centralization, 
politicization and corruption, are obstacles to the establishment of an accountable and 
efficient democratic police force.
 
 
 
Stodiek (2006:85) concludes that the key problem remains the low and functionally 
inadequate level of training and, as a consequence, the qualifications of the multi-
ethnic units. Police authorities in southern Serbia are reluctant to integrate the new 
multi-ethnic units into regular police forces. If the integration problem remains 
unresolved and the special units continue to be comprised solely of Serbs, there is a 
real danger that the concept of multiethnic police could degenerate into a mere 
symbolic gesture. This would mean stagnation and involve the risk of serious 
regression. Once the population and the officers themselves have come to the 
conclusion that multi-ethnic units represent a second choice and thus cannot be taken 
seriously, the whole concept of employing multiethnic police to build peace in post-
conflict situations will be called into question. While it was reasonable and necessary 
to focus on the quantitative goal of deploying a sufficient number of multi-ethnic units 
as soon as possible in the beginning, the focus must shift to improving the 
performance of the new officers if the concept of multi-ethnic police is not to be 
undermined. 
 
Florian Bieber (2010:1,4) argues that despite the extensive efforts made by the 
international community involved in the reform of police forces across the post-
conflict regions of former Yugoslavia, the results have been modest. While conflicts 
have ended and the militarized police forces have become more professional and 
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inclusive, the political influence remains strong. He claims that police reform as a 
short-term post-conflict program in southern Serbia ‘did not result in a permanent 
mechanism to recruit, promote and retain Albanian police officers’. More than two 
years after the conflict, the overall number of Albanians in the police force still 
remained well below their population share. The multiethnic police were often 
overshadowed by the Gendarmerie, which carried out all contentious police operations 
(Bieber 2010:13).
 
 
 
According to Bieber (2010:14-15), the interethnic conflict in southern Serbia 
‘triggered first a localized and minority-focused police reform, but the international 
engagement led to reform initiatives which had a broader scope, encompassing the 
entire policing sector.’ He argues that this expansion reflects two aspects which 
emerged during the initial period of police reform focused on interethnic relations. 
First, without structural changes of the police, including emphasis on community 
policing, the inclusion of minorities is unlikely to shift the overall relationship between 
the state and its citizens. Second, expanding the remit of reform has been an effective 
strategy to secure broad popular support, as measures focused solely on improving 
interethnic relations are often viewed by minorities as privileging them over 
majorities.  
 
Barry J. Ryan (2007:282) claims that the reforms did not sufficiently empower local 
actors over centralized institutions. He argues that his article illustrates the limitations 
of COP, arguing that ‘de-securitization requires the creation of spaces wherein the 
local order being maintained by a locally accountable police is open to deliberation.’  
Ryan (2007:294) argues that the two-stage police reform plan, ‘aimed first to recruit, 
train and deploy representatives of the ‘securitized’ minority communities in order to 
foment legitimacy for state policing structures.’ Then ‘it aimed to institute COP in 
southern Serbia as a mechanism to democratize the region’s security structure.’ The 
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multiethnic police managed to withstand the pressure exerted by separatist extremists 
who regarded them as traitors to the cause of Albanian nationalism. However, the 
multi-ethnic police units had to be protected against this threat by the Gendarmerie, 
which did not contribute to their legitimacy. It also quickly became evident that the 
multi-ethnic police units were poorly trained and resourced. They remained separate 
from the regular police, which continued to operate as before. 
 
Thus, according to Ryan (2007:295), ‘the security sector in the Presevo Valley remains 
relatively unreformed.’ He argues that the disproportionally large number of security 
forces still present in the area, combined with ineffective plans to democratize the 
police, have intensified the sense of unease among local ethnic Albanians. 
Furthermore, the ‘re-securitization’ of ethnic Albanians of southern Serbia is 
underway. He argues that security sector reforms appeared to have merely created ‘the 
chimera of pluralism through the illusion of local control and the false hope of 
accountable policing.’ He concludes that ‘The inherent conservatism in COP does not 
promote the concept as a suitable mechanism for the kind of structural transformation 
of policing practices so often required in post-conflict and transitional regions.’ 
 
Summarizing and comparing the main arguments and conclusions from the three 
articles above, it is striking that they all seem to agree that the multiethnic police force 
in southern Serbia lacks operational qualifications as a result of inadequate training. 
They also seem to agree that, as a consequence, the multiethnic police have not been 
fully integrated with the regular police. Nonetheless, Stodiek’s article seems to be 
particularly positive and optimistic about the multiethnic police reform in southern 
Serbia compared to the other articles. He emphasizes the effect multiethnic police had 
as a confidence building measure, but acknowledges the continued politicization of the 
police. Ryan and Bieber, on the other hand, seem much more negative and pessimistic 
about the reform efforts. While Bieber argues that the results of reform have only been 
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modest, Ryan claims that the introduction of COP has been unsuccessful to the extent 
that the security sector in southern Serbia remains unreformed.                                 
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6. Concluding Discussion  
It seems fair to claim that whether an intervention is a success or failure a (the long-
term effect) – it is determined during the first phase. What happens in this period 
makes crucial preconditions for what is occurring later.  It is in this phase that ‘trade-
offs and the difficult policy choices arise, (…) [and] the best may also be the enemy of 
the good’ (Berdal 2009:20-21).  The trade-offs are consequences of the underlying 
tensions present in most war-torn societies. Tensions may be between short term goals 
(the requirements of security and political stability) and policy objectives vital to long-
term stability.  Among short term goals are physical security, stabilization of 
administration and governance. These are key preconditions for keeping the peace as 
well as for reaching long-term goals like democratization and economic development.  
 
The tension between short and long-term objectives is context-specific, but even under 
the best of circumstances it may be hard to achieve an optimal accordance between 
long-term objectives and the necessary immediate tasks.  In terms of the police reform 
in southern Serbia there seems to be a dilemma of whether to rely on the existing, 
experienced professional police, or trust a new and inexperienced multiethnic police 
unit.  This dilemma has been illustrated by Stodiek (2006:8) who claims that ‘without 
success in fighting crime, the police will not gain trust among the population and this 
may worsen the security situation in general.’ 
 
A police reform may be an attempt to transform a police force from being a reason for 
conflict into becoming a legitimate agent for the state to maintain peace (Bieber 
2010:3-4). However, different priorities may prove contradictory. A relevant example 
is the integration of minorities into a police structure. This measure may be adequate 
as a short time solution, but pose problems in the long-term perspective. The example 
is pertinent to police reform in the “Covic Plan”. It succeeded in the short–term in 
pulling support away from separatist extremists towards moderate Albanian political 
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leaders. However, as the case has shown, the push for rapid recruitment of minorities 
was contradictory to the goal of professionalization of the police - the short-term 
training programs hardly provided for a sufficient education for police officers. 
 
The empirical findings seem to relate well to the challenge cited by Berdal as being 
common in most peace-and statebuilding missions. The short-term goal of ending 
hostilities relied on quick fixes in which multiethnic police reform was an important 
element. Agreement on the integration of Albanians in the security sector was a crucial 
factor for getting the warring parties to start discussions on other issues. However, the 
need for the rapid recruitment and inadequate training for the new officers 
consequently made the multiethnic police a second-tier security provider, only tasked 
with mundane police duties. The Gendarmerie continued to perform ‘real’ police work 
in the Presevo Valley. As a consequence, large parts of the Albanian population kept 
on viewing the Serbian security apparatus with hostility as they were perceived as 
representing the former enemy. Confidence in the multiethnic police remained low, 
especially among the Serbs, who still relied on the ‘old’ police structures, the 
Gendarmerie and the Army, for their security.  
 
As quantity was prioritized over quality, the multiethnic police never got the change to 
take charge of the ‘real’ security issues in the municipalities, either because they were 
not capable or because they were not given the chance. Thus, the short-term goal of 
integrating Albanians in the police structures made the long-term goal of peace, 
stability and interethnic reconciliation harder to achieve. 
 
In order to understand why the multiethnic police reform worked out as it did, it is 
necessary to focus on the tension between local confidence building and police 
professionalism. In this case it seems fair to conclude that the establishment of multi-
ethnic police units and their deployment in Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja led to a 
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significant increase in confidence in the local police among large segments of the 
Albanian population.  
 
People got used to the multi-ethnic patrols, and contact between the population and the 
police improved, not least because of Albanian-speaking officers. The establishment of 
police containers in remote areas gave the population the chance to develop personal 
contact with the police. Community-oriented policing projects were also important 
steps in confidence-building. The establishment of Community Advisory Groups and 
Municipal Safety Councils, and the deployment of Community Policing Officers could 
possibly improve the relationship between the population and the police even more. 
This is particularly necessary for the Serbian population, which is still rather skeptical 
about the suitability of the Albanian police officers to serve all ethnic communities 
(Stodiek 2006:59).  
 
The level of trust is well illustrated by the Albanians who began to turn to the 
multiethnic police with their concerns, which would have been almost unthinkable for 
the mono-ethnic police forces before 2001. Still both Serbs and Albanians are 
skeptical about the policing skills of many multiethnic police officers (Stodiek 
2006:83). A lot remains to be done to achieve goal-effective integration.  
 
At the same time as the Serbian MoI is insisting that the integration of the multiethnic 
police into the regular Serbian police has been successfully completed, the “former” 
multiethnic police officers have not achieved full police status, and are not fully 
accepted by the local population or colleagues in the regular police. Biased promotion 
practices are another point of tension. Moreover, multiethnic police units are neither 
used as confidence-building instruments in police raids nor in search operations 
conducted by the Gendarmerie. Hence, the primary challenge to building confidence in 
the multiethnic police force remains – simultaneously to secure the rights of all ethnic 
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groups in an even-handed manner and be reliable for securing the state’s monopoly of 
force (Stodiek 2006:85). 
 
The answer to the research question, did the multiethnic police contribute to peace in 
the Presevo Valley, seems rather straightforward. Multiethnic police reform and the 
initial establishment of the multiethnic police force in southern Serbia did directly 
contribute to the peace settlement ending major hostilities in 2001. Inclusion of 
multiethnic police reform and integration of Albanians in police structures in the 
“Covic Plan” enabled the warring parties to start talks on other issues which in turn 
resulted in a peace settlement. Even though the resulting peace was somehow fragile, a 
return to major ethnic hostilities did not occur during the period studied in thesis. 
 
However, the grievances which initially fuelled the insurgency are probably still 
present in the Presevo Valley and interethnic reconciliation is far from complete. 
Furthermore, the multiethnic police reform carried out in southern Serbia relied too 
heavily on quick fixes. A large number of Albanians were recruited into the newly 
established multiethnic police force in a fairly short period, in many cases without 
fulfilling the qualifications required. In addition to inadequate training carried out by 
both the international community and the Serbian MoI, this made the multiethnic 
police force a second-tier security actor in the Presevo Valley, not trusted by segments 
of the local population and only enjoying a low level of legitimacy. Safety and security 
issues continued to be handled by the same elements within the Serbian security 
apparatus which had played a part in the 2000-2001 insurgency and the decades 
preceding it, probably contributing to the continued presence of Albanian grievances. 
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Thus, multiethnic police reform did contribute to peace in the short-term, but did 
probably not have any significant effect on long-term peace and stability. The promise 
of police reform and integration of Albanian into police structures was a contributing 
factor in ending the hostilities, but the multiethnic police force did not prove itself an 
effective and relevant peacebuilding tool in southern Serbia.  
 
The evidence presented indicates that professionalism was sacrificed for confidence-
building measures. The integration of Albanians into the multiethnic police force 
increased the confidence in the newly established police force within the majority of 
the population in the three municipalities. On the other hand, the qualifications of the 
newly recruited officers were inadequate which affected the overall professionalism of 
the multiethnic police force. The fact that the new multiethnic police units were 
stationed in containers in the vicinity of Albanian villages resulted in a closer 
relationship between these units and the local population, but disabled them from 
learning and practicing proper police duties. It can be argued that the introduction of 
community-oriented policing had the same effect on the professionalism of the 
multiethnic police force as it prioritized confidence-building over increasing the 
operational capabilities of the multiethnic police force. As a result, ‘real’ police work 
continued to be done by the Gendarmerie or the regular police.  
 
Obviously, the perception of the multiethnic police varies both within and between the 
different ethnic groups in southern Serbia. However, it seems clear that the Albanians 
view the multiethnic police units in more positive terms than the Serbs do. This is 
likely a result of the feeling among Albanians that the multiethnic police also represent 
their ethnic group, in contrast to prior to the its establishment when the police was 
viewed with hostility and skepticism, representing their adversary and enemy. The 
Serbs, on the other hand, view the multiethnic police more negatively and still rely on 
the Gendarmerie, the Army and the regular police for their security. For the Serbs, it is 
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likely that the multiethnic police force is viewed as a concession to the Albanian side 
and representing something close to an enemy within the state.  
 
The establishment of the multiethnic police force in southern Serbia and the reforms 
associated with it was a strategy based on the view of peacebuilding in which 
construction and support of liberal democratic institutions is an important element. 
Creating representative institutions tasked with maintaining a safe and secure 
environment fits neatly into the statebuilding approach to peacebuilding. The evidence 
provided shows that the challenges that most peace operations in general and policing 
missions in particular faces was present in southern Serbia. As mentioned above, as a 
peacebuilding strategy, the multiethnic police reforms in southern Serbia was 
successful in the short-term, but less so in the long-term.  
  
 
 
 
 
74 
 
Bibliography  
 
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), Balkan Insight, History and Politics 
of South Serbia (2012-11-03) [online]. –  
URL: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/history-and-politics-of-south-serbia 
 
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), Balkan Insight, South Serbia 
Demographics (2012-10-23) [online]. –  
URL: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/south-serbia-demographics 
 
Bieber, Florian (2010). ‘Policing the Peace after Yugoslavia: Police Reform between 
External Imposition and Domestic Reform’. Discussion Paper: 10-7. Prepared for the 
GRIPS State-Building Workshop 2010: Organizing Police Forces in Post-Conflict 
Peace-Support Operations, January 27-28
th
, 2010.  
 
Gligorijevic, Milo (Ed.) (2001). Serbia After Milosevic: program for the Solution of 
the Crisis in the Pcinja District, Belgrade: Liber-Press. 
 
ICG Balkans Report No. 116 (2001). Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long Term 
Solution?, Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels: International Crisis Group. 
 
ICG Europe Report No. 152 (2003). Southern Serbia’s Fragile Peace, 
Belgrade/Brussels: International Crisis Group. 
 
ICG Europe Briefing No. 43 (2006). Southern Serbia: In Kosovo’s Shadow, 
Belgrade/Pristina/Brussels: International Crisis Group. 
 
ICG Europe Report No. 186 (2007). Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley, 
Belgrade/Pristina/Brussels: International Crisis Group. 
 
Judah, Tim (2008). Kosovo - What Everyone Needs To Know, Oxford/New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Judah, Tim (2002). Kosovo - War and Revenge. Second Edition, New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press. 
 
King, Iain and Mason, Whit (2006). Peace At Any Price. How the World Failed 
Kosovo, London: Hurst and Company. 
 
Mønnesland, Svein (2006). Før Jugoslavia og Etter, 5. utgave, Oslo: Sypress Forlag. 
 
Obradovic, Pedja (2011, April 20). Serbia Makes Uneven Progress on Integrating 
Minorities, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), Balkan Insight, (2012-
10-23) [online]. – URL: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-makes-
uneven-progress-on-integrating-minoritie 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
Ryan, Barry J. (2007). “Qasi-pluralism in a Quasi-peace: South Serbia’s Multi-ethnic 
Police”, International Peacekeeping, 14:2, 282-297, Routledge, London. 
 
Stodiek, Thorsten (2006). The OSCE and the Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Forces 
in the Balkans. CORE Working Paper 14. Hamburg: Centre for OSCE Research, 
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.  
 
Wikipedia, Albanians in south Serbia (2012-10-23) [online]. –  
URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanians_in_Central_Serbia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
